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Controlled foreign company (CFC) rules are anti-avoidance provisions designed to deter 
taxpayers from shifting their capital (and resultant income) to low-tax jurisdictions. Adoption of 
these rules in South Africa coincided with the relaxation of exchange control laws which 
opened up borders to inward and outward capital flows. South Africa’s CFC regime has been 
amended over the years to become one of the most sophisticated amongst the G20 and 
aligned with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Action 
3 recommendations (per the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Project).  
 
Abusive profit-shifting tactics committed by multinational enterprises (MNEs) have caused the 
OECD to recommend that CFC rules be strengthened globally to combat this behaviour. 
However, in the United States and the United Kingdom, recent reforms appear to have 
weakened these countries’ CFC (or CFC-equivalent) legislation, countering the OECD’s 
recommendations. Such manoeuvres improve the profitability of these nations’ MNEs by 
allowing their tax bills to remain lower than their international competitors’. As such, there is a 
danger of starting a race to the corporate tax-rate bottom where developing nations will be the 
losers, considering their greater reliance on corporate tax revenues than their developed 
counterparts.  
 
India and Brazil, both developing nations and BRICS members like South Africa, also aren’t 
prioritising the strengthening of their CFC regulations – their focus is rather on improving 
transfer pricing (TP) legislation and enforcement to combat the damaging effects MNEs’ 
avoidance practices are having on tax revenue collections in those countries. The existence 
of South Africa’s advanced CFC legislation amongst a global trend of a weakening in, or the 
non-adoption of, CFC rules may hinder the competitiveness of South African MNEs. The 
current CFC regime could thus serve the purpose of stifling growth and foreign direct 
investment, instead of only deterring profit-shifting behaviour. 
 
TP legislation targeted at MNEs (the biggest profit-shifting culprits) may yield the most 
effective anti-avoidance results. South Africa’s recently enhanced TP reporting requirements 
are key to solving the offshore profit-shifting puzzle, as these reports will reveal information 
about an MNE’s global operations and resultant profit-shifting activities. In addition, the 
revision to the TP arm’s length principle to align compensation and value creation, will see 
profit-shifting MNEs bear the tax they were trying to avoid. It appears that the anti-avoidance 
purpose embodied within CFC regulations overlaps with the anti-avoidance mechanisms that 
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these enhanced TP rules are designed to achieve. Thus, in a South African context, the most 
efficient way to curb tax avoidance may be to rely on TP, rather than CFC, legislation. As such, 
it is recommended that South Africa’s CFC regulations be repealed.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
1.1.1. The origin of South Africa’s controlled foreign company rules 
At the end of the apartheid era, South African businesses were able to integrate into the global 
economy. Relaxation of local exchange control regulations accelerated this integration by 
allowing residents to broaden their offshore investment and business operations horizons. At 
the same time, however, the South African Revenue authorities raised concerns regarding the 
erosion of the South African tax base1: taxpayers could devise ways to defer or reduce their 
South African tax liabilities by either rerouting passive income through an offshore entity or by 
accumulating income (and thus deferring tax) in a foreign entity2. 
 
In a post-democratic South Africa, the Katz Commission was established to assist with the 
reform of South Africa’s tax policies3. In addition to concerns raised regarding capital flight4, 
the commission understood the importance of balancing this risk with the country’s need to 
ensure competitive tax neutrality of South African foreign direct investment5. It is with these 
and the anti-avoidance objectives in mind, combined with the imminent overhaul of South 
Africa’s tax system from a source to a residence basis, that it was recommended that South 
Africa introduce controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation6. 
 
CFC rules are anti-avoidance provisions that are designed to deter taxpayers from shifting 
their capital (and resultant income) to low-tax jurisdictions or tax havens. This mechanism 
ensures that offshore profits remain within the tax base of the parent/shareholder7, by taxing 
the undistributed income of a CFC in the hands of its shareholders on a current basis8. The 
anti-deferral principle embodied within these rules is, however, anti-competitive from a 
business perspective, since anti-deferral calls for complete taxation whilst the desire to remain 
competitive necessitates complete exemption9. 
 
 
1 South Africa, Commission of Inquiry into certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa [Katz 
Commission], 1997:para 2.2.1 
2 Katz Commission, 1997:para 8.1.1 
3 Koch, Schoeman & Van Tonder, 2005:194 
4 Katz Commission, 1997:para 2.2.1 
5 Katz Commission, 1997:para 3.1.2.7 
6 Katz Commission, 1997:para 8.3.1.1 
7 OECD, 2015:para 7  
8 Oguttu, 2009:74 
9 South Africa, National Treasury [National Treasury], 2002:2 
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When it came to designing South Africa’s CFC rules to curb avoidance behaviour, the 
government was sensitive to the fact that South African multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
required investment, as well as the ability to compete in global markets. The government 
needed to perform a balancing act – the South African corporate need to remain globally 
competitive had to be accommodated, whilst the revenue authority had to ensure that the tax 
base didn’t disappear altogether. In attempting to manage this balance, it was observed that 
overly strict CFC regulations could hamper an MNE’s international competitiveness10, while 
lax CFC rules could result in capital outflows. It is for these reasons that the revenue authority 
employed the expertise of foreign experts to draft South Africa’s CFC legislation11 to achieve 
a balance between taxing foreign income and remaining globally competitive. 
 
Since their adoption in the 1990s, South Africa’s CFC rules have evolved to become one of 
the more sophisticated and complicated versions of these rules amongst countries forming 
part of the Group of Twenty organisation (G20)12, with little need to strengthen them further13. 
Although South Africa’s CFC rules were drafted to be as closely in line with international 
standards as possible (as these rules were tailored according to the norms of the foreign 
experts’ home (developed) countries), what was needed for South Africa’s unique economic 
environment may not have been adequately taken into account14. 
 
1.1.2. The global CFC regime 
The setting of the international tax standards has largely been administered by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, these norms 
have been viewed as biased towards wealthier OECD member states15. Since the global 
financial crisis, however, geopolitical changes saw the power of influence shift towards the 
G20, such that these countries, including the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (BRICS), played an active role in the development of the OECD’s Base Erosion 
 
10 For example, where an MNE (subject to CFC rules in its resident country) operates in a low-tax 
jurisdiction, profits earned in this jurisdiction would be made subject to tax in the MNE’s resident 
country, thereby eroding profitability and potentially hampering the MNE’s ability to compete in that 
foreign territory. 
11 South Africa, Davis Tax Committee [Davis Tax Committee], 2016:15 
12 Brauner, 2016:984 – The G20 includes both OECD member countries and developing countries 
(such as BRICS) that don’t belong to the OECD. All members of the G20 are considered to have an 
equal voice. 
13 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:36 
14 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:15 
15 Brauner, 2016:981 
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and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project16. Fifteen Actions were identified along three key pillars17 as 
part of the OECD’s 2013 Action Plan to address BEPS18. On 5 October 2015, the OECD 
published thirteen final reports outlining thirteen of the project’s fifteen consensus actions19. 
Issuing these recommendations didn’t equate to immediate adoption as their enactment into 
law is largely dependent on independent countries’ consideration and subsequent regulatory 
implementation (this is required for these standards to have the “teeth” of legal enforceability). 
 
These developments brought the standard of CFC rules into question, with the OECD 
encouraging countries to adopt stricter CFC policies as recommended in the BEPS Action 3 
report. The report, however, acknowledged that global improvements in base-erosion 
monitoring will only be adequately achieved through the universal adoption of enhanced CFC 
rules. Despite these recommendations, many European countries, such as the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands, have relaxed their CFC rules to enhance the global 
competitiveness of their resident MNEs 20. South Africa appears to be one of the few countries 
that brought its rules somewhat in line with the recommendations of the BEPS Action 3 report.  
 
After a global outcry (largely triggered by the global financial crisis) over the ability of MNEs to 
garner large profits whilst paying minimal tax21, the OECD further recommended that CFCs 
should not only protect a resident country’s tax base, but also the tax base of other countries22. 
This has become a sensitive topic between Europe and the United States of America (US), as 
many US MNEs have caused base erosion across an array of European countries. This has 
largely been as a result of the US Congress extending the benefits of exempt interest and 
dividends (combined with other exemptions under its Subpart F23 rules) to these MNEs at the 
expense of many European regimes24. With the existence of such self-serving motives, it’s 
hard to imagine that countries would actively seek to adopt more stringent CFC rules in the 
hope that other countries would act in the same way. The world thus faces a prisoner’s 
dilemma25 with regards to the adoption of the BEPS Action 3 recommendations. 
 
16 Brauner, 2016:984 
17 OECD, 2015:3 – The three pillars are: (i) “introducing coherence in the domestic rules that affect 
cross-border activities”, (ii) “reinforcing substance requirements in the existing international 
standards”, and (iii) “improving transparency as well as certainty”.  
18 OECD, 2015:3 
19 Deloitte.com, 2019 
20 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:36 
21 Brauner, 2016:989 
22 OECD, 2015:para 17 
23 United States, Internal Revenue Service, 2014 – “The Subpart F provisions eliminate deferral of US 
tax on some categories of foreign income by taxing certain US persons currently on their pro rata 
share of such income earned by their controlled foreign corporations.” 
24 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:13 
25 The prisoner's dilemma is a principle derived from game theory. It illustrates how cooperation 
between two rational individuals is not always guaranteed even though cooperative behaviour would 
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Despite the involvement of the BRICS countries in the compilation of the BEPS project actions 
(and therefore Action 3), India and Brazil have been slow to adopt a more stringent CFC 
regime. Brazil’s rules have been criticised for being used as a tax collection tool26, while India 
hasn’t yet adopted its own CFC rules. It instead places reliance on the place of effective 
management (PoEM) rules to curb cross-border anti-avoidance27. It is also interesting to 
observe the trend followed by developed OECD countries (as described above) that has seen 
a consistent weakening of CFC rules, despite the opposite being recommended by the OECD. 
 
1.1.3. Administering South African CFC compliance 
With increased legislative complexity comes an enhancement of administrative requirements. 
Many South African tax practitioners have expressed concern regarding the effort and costs 
associated with CFC compliance in light of the limited benefit this provides to the fiscus28. 
South African taxpayers subject to the CFC rules find themselves burdened with either 
performing time-consuming and complex calculations or submitting extensive documentation 
on their foreign operations, in order to prove that they qualify for applicable CFC exemptions29.   
 
In 2013, the Minister of Finance established the Davis Tax Committee to “inquire into the role 
of the tax system in the promotion of inclusive economic growth, employment creation, 
development and fiscal sustainability”30. As part of its approach, the committee has 
commented on South Africa’s existing CFC rules and their interaction with the BEPS Action 3 
report, and made various recommendations to the Minister. The committee has provided 
suggestions to National Treasury to simplify CFC legislation (such as the creation of a country 
white list31), yet many of these recommendations have not been considered for enactment32. 
This is curious considering the time-saving benefit these recommendations could bring to the 
revenue authorities whilst yielding the same result on revenue collections. Although 
recommendations to lower the hurdle inclusion rate33 have been proposed in the recent draft 
 
be in both individuals’ best interests. The overall outcome of the experiment is dependent on an 
individual’s perceived reward for individualistic compared to cooperative behaviour. 
26 Teijeiro, 2015 
27 Deloitte.com, 2017b:45 
28 Deloitte.com, 2018a 
29 Deloitte.com, 2018a 
30 South Africa, n.d. 
31 If an entity that is considered to be a CFC of a South African taxpayer is also resident in a 
predefined list of countries (i.e., a white list), income earned from this entity will qualify for an 
automatic exemption. 
32 Deloitte.com, 2018 
33 For the purpose of determining whether a CFC’s net income (as defined in Section 9D(2A) of the 
South African Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (ITA)) is to be included as part of a taxpayer’s taxable 
income, the foreign tax payable on this income must be at least 75% of the South African tax payable 
on this same income. 
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Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (Draft TLAB; proposed change from 75% to 67.5%34), it will be 
interesting to observe whether this will be sufficient to prevent the CFC rules from turning into 
a tax collection tool, given the global trend in the reduction of corporate tax rates35. 
Furthermore, given the global uncertainty regarding the adoption of more stringent CFC rules, 
and considering that South Africa should rather follow international trends than set them36, 
now would be an ideal time to incorporate such suggestions until the rest of the world leads 
with revised CFC enforcement. 
 
1.1.4. Transfer pricing and country-by-country reporting aid the fight against profit 
shifting 
In addition to the South African MNEs’ administrative burden of ensuring CFC regulatory 
compliance, these entities are also required to comply with recently amended transfer pricing 
(TP) rules, and potentially with country-by-country (CbC) reporting. The revision of the TP 
documentation required for submission and the introduction of CbC reports are additional 
initiatives that came out of the BEPS project (Action 13 specifically), which have been adopted 
by the South African Revenue Service (SARS)37. The idea is that the enhanced transparency 
created between MNEs and global revenue authorities would assist with tackling the tax-base 
erosion challenges. 
 
The objective of TP reporting is to ensure that cross-border transactions between related 
parties occur at market-related prices38, while the purpose of CbC reporting is to enable 
authorities to view related/inter-group transactions from a big-picture perspective39. The 
documentary requirements for TP and CbC reporting require the extensive disclosure of MNE 
information through master files40, local files41, specified transaction records and specified 
group disclosure42 (to name a few). Although this may seem burdensome, this level of 
reporting enhances the transparency between revenue authorities and taxpayers, and thereby 
assists in the achievement of the BEPS project objective43. In addition, the recent revisions to 
 
34 South Africa, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill [Taxation Laws Amendment Bill], 2019:11 
35 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:5 
36 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:3 
37 Deloitte.com, 2018b  
38 Deloitte.com, 2018b 
39 EY.com, 2017 
40 A master file includes details of an MNE’s global operations (i.e., a group operational overview) and 
TP policies. 
41 A local file is prepared per local legal entity, as it’s designed to include details of intercompany 
transactions between each local entity and their foreign related parties. 
42 PKF.co.za, 2017 
43 TheSAIT.org, 2018 – Namely, the objective of eliminating or minimising transactions that erode a 
country’s tax base by routing profits to low-tax jurisdictions or tax havens. 
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the interpretation of the arm’s length principle to align compensation with the underlying 
creation of value has revolutionised how arm’s length prices in transactions are to be 
interpreted and treated by both taxpayers and SARS44. The combination of these anti-
avoidance mechanisms thus appears to overlap with the purpose of South Africa’s CFC rules 
– the prevention of the erosion of the local tax base. 
 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
When CFC rules were first introduced in South Africa’s tax legislation, SARS’ intentions of 
curbing avoidance practices were well-founded. Since then, however, MNEs’ cross-border 
transactions have grown in volume and have also become increasingly complex, which has 
resulted in intensified taxpayer compliance requirements45. Enhanced scrutiny of MNEs by the 
revenue authorities is understandable, given that recent studies have shown that a small 
number of firms are responsible for most cross-border profit-shifting transactions46. As such, 
the TP approach to determining an arm’s length price between related parties has been 
enhanced to align compensation and value creation, thereby ensuring equitable remuneration 
for all (related) parties involved in a transaction. Thus, the anti-avoidance purpose of the CFC 
rules (both in principle and in terms of reporting) appears to complement the mechanisms to 
prevent tax-base erosion that the TP arm’s length requirements, TP rules and CbC reports 
are designed to achieve.  
 
After taking the above into consideration, the following primary research question was derived: 
 
Can the purpose of curbing tax avoidance embedded within South Africa’s CFC rules be more 
simply achieved? 
 
1.3. SCOPE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
This dissertation focuses on the currently enacted CFC legislation in South Africa and 
considers elements relating to interpretation notes, explanatory memoranda, recent 
developments and judgements, as well as proposed amendments. Commentary to the extent 
that these items relate to the research question are provided. Although Section 9D of the ITA 
has rules to specifically deal with insurers (captive cell companies) and financial institutions, 
these sectors are not covered in detail, as such an analysis could deviate from answering the 
 
44 KPMG.us, 2019 
45 OECD, 2015b:11 
46 Reynolds & Wier, 2018:2 
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research question. The overall consideration of Section 9D’s principles and purpose, however, 
applies to these entities. 
  
The current CFC (or CFC-equivalent) legislation adopted by Brazil and India respectively is 
assessed in terms of how effectively these rules achieve the anti-avoidance purpose. In 
addition, commentary (including articles from reliable and well-recognised sources) and 
publications (from universities and/or globally recognised organisations) addressing the 
economic viability of the adoption of CFC rules in these capital-importing economies, as well 
as the desire for their MNEs to remain internationally competitive, are considered and 
commented on within the context of the research question. 
 
Furthermore, this dissertation expands its focus to assess the current CFC and Subpart F 
legislation in the UK and the US respectively, and to examine the reasons for these recent 
amendments despite the recommendations of BEPS Action 3. The UK’s and the US’ positions 
on implementing Action 3 recommendations are only considered for the purposes of assessing 
the developed world’s view on new proposals for CFC rules. These amendments are 
considered and commented on to the extent that they address the research question.  
 
Publications and commentary (as described above) assessing and explaining the impact of 
BEPS Actions 3 and 13, as well as Action 13’s interaction with Actions 8, 9 and 10, are also 
incorporated as part of the focus of this dissertation. These documents are used to assess the 
extent of the adoption of Action 3 in a South African context, and whether such adoption 
assists in answering the research question. Consideration is also given to whether items 
addressed in Action 13 (as proposed and/or enacted in South African legislation) overlap with 
the purpose of CFC legislation and whether this purpose can also be achieved through the 
use of TP and (potentially) CbC reporting. A further assessment considers the amendments 
to the arm’s length principle embodied in South African TP rules and the potential overlap this 
has with existing CFC principles. Conclusions are then drawn to the extent that the research 
question was addressed. 
 
1.4. LIMITATION OF THIS DISSERTATION 
This dissertation focuses on the impact of tax legislation and policies on avoidance behaviour. 
Considerations regarding the impact of legislation and policies on illegal behaviour, such as 
tax evasion, do not fall within the ambit of this paper.  
 
- 8 - 
 
Legislation in the context of the South African ITA refers to the law as applicable following the 
promulgation of the 2018 Taxation Laws Amendment Act. BEPS Actions 3, 8, 9, 10 and 13, 
the UK CFC rules and the US Subpart F rules, TP regulations and CbC reporting requirements 
affecting India and Brazil, as well as those countries’ CFC (or CFC-equivalent) legislation are 
only considered for this dissertation where all internationally recommended frameworks are 
as they stand at 28 February 2019 and all necessary laws have been enacted by 28 February 
2019. Any amendments, draft documents or proposals made thereafter are considered for 
light commentary only. 
 
1.5. RESEARCH METHOD 
As the prime focus of this research is to evaluate the purpose of South African CFC legislation, 
this study is conducted within a critical and evaluative theoretical framework – a method which 
incorporates the interpretivist and positivist paradigms. In assessing the regulation’s purpose, 
a qualitative approach is adopted, allowing for questioning whether proposals made under 
BEPS Action 3 and Action 13 would assist in simplifying compliance concerns, as well as 
whether other comparable BRICS countries (India and Brazil) face similar challenges. 
 
1.6. STRUCTURE 
Chapter 2 provides a historic overview of the origination of the CFC rules both globally and in 
South Africa, how these rules have come to evolve and how the current mechanisms work to 
curb avoidance.  
 
Chapter 3 explores the appropriateness of South Africa adopting first-world policies, and 
considers the role the international community will need to play in the implementation of BEPS 
Action 3 recommendations. Considerations of the likelihood of universal adoption are also 
explored (especially considering the UK’s and the US’ recent amendments to their respective 
CFC and Subpart F rules, which counter the BEPS project recommendations). 
 
Chapter 4 explores both the revision to the arm’s length principle and the mechanics behind 
the current TP and CbC reporting requirements (within the context of Action 13). Whether 
these aspects share the same purpose of deterring base erosion as CFC rules do, are 
considered. The burden of compliance on taxpayers (especially MNEs) with regards to CFC 
rules, TP rules and CbC reporting are also explored.  
 
Chapter 5 considers how other BRICS countries (Brazil and India) combat avoidance with their 
CFC (or CFC-equivalent) rules, given the developing nature of their economies, the desire for 
- 9 - 
 
their MNEs to remain internationally competitive, as well as their stance on the adoption of 
BEPS Actions. 
 
Chapter 6 provides conclusions and recommendations. 
  
- 10 - 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORY AND MECHANICS OF THE CFC RULES 
 
2.1. HISTORIC OVERVIEW 
CFC legislation was initially adopted by the US as part of its Subpart F rules in 1962, with the 
intention to introduce capital export neutrality47. In the 1970s, West Germany, Japan and 
Canada introduced similar legislation, with more countries adopting the rules during the 1980s 
and 1990s48. By the mid-1990s at least fifteen countries had enacted CFC legislation49, and 
on 1 July 1997 South Africa became the nineteenth country to introduce CFC legislation50. By 
1998, the OECD Council had recommended that CFC rules should be adopted globally51. 
 
The worldwide adoption of CFC rules largely came about as a result of the relaxation of 
exchange control laws in many OECD countries between the 1970s and 1990s. The removal 
of these capital barriers opened up borders to inward and outward capital flows52. This not 
only enhanced the cross-border activities of many MNEs53, but also allowed these entities to 
design their operational structures in ways which could be perceived as an abuse of tax 
regimes54.  
 
Corporates (and their shareholders) were thus in a position to take advantage of the 
international tax arbitrage made available to them through the variation in tax rules from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Generally (subject to the applicable tax rules in varying jurisdictions), 
a foreign corporation would be taxed on its foreign-source income while shareholders would 
be taxed on distributions received from the foreign entity (either in the foreign jurisdiction, the 
shareholders’ resident country or both)55 – this is due to the fact that corporations and their 
shareholders are treated as separate persons for tax purposes, thus their respective income 
streams are taxed separately56. Instances could arise in which shareholders and the foreign 
entity pay very little tax compared to the taxes that would’ve been paid if the foreign entity was 
 
47 Schmidt, 2016:89;  
Davis Tax Committee, 2016:11 – Capital export neutrality is achieved when resident taxpayers are 
taxed equally, regardless of whether they invest in the local economy or abroad. Similarly, capital 
import neutrality is achieved when income earned from an offshore investment is taxed at the same 
rate as the taxpayer’s resident tax rate. 
48 Schmidt, 2016:89 
49 Ibid 
50 Sandler, 1998:xv 
51 Schmidt, 2016:89 
52 Sandler, 1998:1 
53 Ibid 
54 Sandler, 1998:2 
55 Sandler, 1998:5 
56 Sandler, 1998:4 
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incorporated in the same jurisdiction as its shareholders, or shareholders could avoid57 tax 
altogether if the foreign entity was incorporated in a low-tax jurisdiction or tax haven58. 
Instances could also arise in which shareholders could defer tax (indefinitely) if a foreign entity 
did not declare dividends. 
 
It is important to note that a taxpayer’s freedom to legally avoid taxes (tax avoidance) is not 
the same as illegal activities involving non-compliance with laws and regulations (tax 
evasion)59. The freedom to transfer capital abroad resulted in a legal arbitrage which greatly 
enhanced taxpayers’ means to defer or avoid tax in their resident countries. As a result, 
Revenue authorities sought to curb this avoidance60 through legislative amendments to both 
domestic laws and international double tax agreements (DTAs) and by adhering to 
international anti-avoidance initiatives (such as the BEPS Action Plan)61. Thus, in the wake of 
the elimination of exchange control regulations62, many countries enacted domestic CFC 
legislation. This was seen as international best practice to guard against domestic tax-base 
erosion through the export of capital to foreign entities63. 
 
2.2. RECENT INTERNATIONAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE DEVELOPMENTS 
Since the OECD’s initial recommendation for the global adoption of CFC legislation, the rules 
have once again come under the spotlight. In the wake of the global financial crisis64, the 
OECD was given the responsibility of developing solutions to tackle the problem of large 
MNEs’ aggressive tax planning schemes and the adverse impact this had on countries’ tax-
revenue collections65. As the global economy became increasingly characterised by MNEs’ 
cross-border activities66, mismatches in domestic legislation and cross-border economic 
behaviour resulted in uncoordinated tax rules, and corporates were able to develop structures 
to take advantage of these domestic and international tax asymmetries67. Some MNEs were 
found to not be paying their “fair share” of taxes by using structures that exploited these 
mismatches and allowed for the artificial shifting of profits from the jurisdiction where they were 
 
57 Oguttu, 2015:518 – “Tax avoidance involves using legal methods of arranging one’s affairs, so as to 
pay less tax. This is done by using loopholes in tax laws and exploiting them within legal parameters.” 
58 Ibid 
59 Oguttu, 2015:518  
60 Sandler, 1998:4 
61 Oguttu, 2015:517-518 
62 Sandler, 1998:8 
63 Schmidt, 2018:89 
64 Oguttu, 2015:517 
65 Brauner, 2016:989; 976 
66 Oguttu, 2015:524 
67 Ibid 
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earned to tax havens with limited economic activity68. It was in response to media interest in 
these MNE schemes that G20 politicians initiated the BEPS project69 and called on the OECD 
to develop an Action Plan that would provide countries with instruments that would better align 
taxing rights with economic activity70. Of the fifteen actions coming out of the Action Plan, 
Action 3 relates to the development of recommendations for the design of CFC rules71. 
 
2.3. THE DESIGN OF CFC LEGISLATION ACCORDING TO THE BEPS PROJECT 
CFC rules are designed to deter taxpayers from shifting profits offshore for the purpose of 
reducing or deferring tax, as well as to protect a shareholder’s resident-country’s tax revenues 
by ensuring that certain profits remain in that country’s tax base72. 
 
In order to effectively identify and tackle base-stripping (the shifting of profits from a taxpayer’s 
resident country to another foreign entity which that taxpayer controls73), the OECD’s Action 
3 report lays out recommendations in the form of six building blocks which are necessary for 
CFC rules to act as an effective preventative measure. These rules can be broken down into 
the following categories74: 
i. Control over a CFC: The first building block defines what a CFC is by including the 
definition of control, while the second building block lists various exemptions and 
threshold requirements which could cause an entity to fall outside of the CFC ambit; 
ii. Income of a CFC: The third building block defines CFC income, the fourth lays out 
the requirements for computing income, while the fifth describes the rules for 
attributing income (in their design, these building blocks factor in typical avoidance 
techniques and include measures to counter them); and 
iii. Prevention of double taxation: The sixth building block addresses the prevention 
or elimination of double taxation. 
 
Once it has been established that these factors are evident, a CFC is considered to exist and 
imputation of the CFC’s income back into the tax net of the country of the resident shareholder 
may be required75. 
 
68 Oguttu, 2018:325 
69 Brauner, 2016:989 
70 OECD, 2013:11 
71 Schmidt, 2018:90 – Action 3 falls under the first pillar, namely coherence in domestic tax rules that 
affect cross-border transactions. 
72 OECD, 2015:13 
73 OECD, 2015:16 
74 OECD, 2015:9 
75 Note that this is a high-level summary of the general application of the rules. Whether an entity is 
deemed to be a CFC, and thus whether its income is imputed, is subject to the applicable legislation 
of various countries. 
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2.3.1. Control over a CFC 
When a resident taxpayer influences the actions of a foreign entity it controls, such actions, 
including those that relate to the movement of capital and profits, can be seen as a mere 
extension of those of the resident taxpayer. Action 3 defines control as either legal control (a 
shareholder’s percentage of voting rights by holding share capital), economic control (a 
shareholder’s rights to profits, capital and assets, i.e., control by entitlement), de facto control 
(consideration of who has the ability to direct or influence day-to-day activities) or control 
based on consolidation (by considering whether a foreign entity has been consolidated for 
accounting purposes) 76. In testing whether control is evident, the impact of legal and economic 
control needs to be considered primarily, while de facto elements should be secondary 
considerations. A combination of the two (legal and de facto control) can be used to test the 
impact of control based on consolidation77. Overall, Action 3 recommends that if residents hold 
a minimum of 50% control in a foreign entity (however that control might come about), it should 
be treated as “controlled”78. 
 
When control can be exerted (either directly or indirectly), the controlling party/parties 
has/have the ability to dictate the financial and economic actions of the CFC. With this control 
comes the risk of BEPS, which the CFC rules attempt to address by limiting the CFC’s scope 
through exemptions and threshold requirements79. As the risk is that profits could be artificially 
shifted to low-tax jurisdictions, Action 3 recommends the use of exemptions80 (such as a 
country blacklist that would subject listed countries’ CFC income to imputation or exempt the 
income if the jurisdiction is listed on a white list81) and threshold requirements82 (such as a de-
minimis threshold where CFC income is not considered for attribution if it falls under a certain 
threshold or a tax rate threshold which exempts attribution of a CFC’s income if the foreign 
entity’s local tax rate is higher than the local rate of its shareholder83). The aim of these 
recommendations is to make the CFC rules more targeted and effective. 
 
In summary, the purpose of the control consideration is to subject foreign entities located in 
low-tax jurisdictions, that are controlled by non-resident shareholders and where a risk for 
artificial profit shifting exists, to Action 3’s recommended CFC rules (under specific 
circumstances). 
 
76 OECD, 2015:26, 27, para 35 
77 Ibid 
78 OECD, 2015:21 
79 OECD, 2015:33, para 50 
80 OECD, 2015:33, para 52 
81 OECD, 2015:36, 37, para 62 
82 OECD, 2015:33, para 52 
83 OECD, 2015:33, para 52-53 
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2.3.2. Income of a CFC and anti-avoidance considerations 
It is evident that the CFC rules aim to identify instances of artificial profit shifting by adopting 
a risk-based approach. Once a CFC has been identified, the next steps are to attribute income 
(with certain BEPS risks associated with it) to the controlling parties of the CFC in their relevant 
jurisdiction84. The separation of income from the activity which created it, in an effort to reduce 
taxes payable, is a key BEPS risk indicator and certain factors are considered to identify this 
income85. These factors include considering how mobile (geographically) the income could be, 
whether the income was earned with the assistance of related parties, and whether any (or 
what underlying) activities occurred within the CFC86.  
 
As income varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, flexibility remains important to allow countries 
to define CFC income in accordance with their domestic laws87. To help establish this 
definition, Action 3 outlines the following three approaches which could be applied in isolation 
or combination:  
i. Categorical analysis: Current CFC rules attribute income based on how it is 
categorised (this is often subject to jurisdictional discretion). These categories 
include: (i) the legal classification of income (such as dividends, interest, insurance 
income, royalties and sales/service income), (ii) how related transaction parties are 
to be treated, and (iii) the source of the income88. Many existing CFC rules consider 
(i) and (ii) in combination, as profit shifting could be made easier through the 
construct of favourable transactions between related parties. In addition, the source 
of the CFC’s income is considered with the premise that income earned from bona 
fide business activities employed by the CFC are less likely to raise concerns about 
profit shifting89. 
ii. Substance analysis: In a slightly more comprehensive take on the source analysis 
noted in sub-category (iii) above, one needs to consider the substance of the 
activities of the CFC in detail in order to determine whether the CFC had the ability 
to earn the income itself90. Either a threshold test (a set level of activity could result 
in CFC income from being excluded from the definition) or a proportionate analysis 
test (the proportionate amount of income earned in relation to a proportionate 
 
84 OECD, 2015:43, para 72 
85 OECD, 2015:43, para 74 
86 OECD, 2015:43, para 74 
87 OECD, 2015:43, para 73 
88 OECD, 2015:44, para 78 
89 OECD, 2015:46, para 80 
90 OECD, 2015:47, para 81 
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amount of activity) can be applied to assist with establishing whether there was 
substance to the earning of the CFC’s income91. 
iii. Excessive profits analysis: At the time of issuing the Action 3 report, this 
approach wasn’t featured in any country’s CFC rules. The analysis considers 
whether income was earned in excess of a “normal” return that would be expected 
from an investment in the CFC, after taking into account the facts and 
circumstances associated with that particular investment. The excess profits earned 
over and above the normal return should be treated as attributable CFC income. 
This is targeted at mispriced transactions which typically occur between related 
parties where profits are inflated in excess of what is considered to be “normal” – for 
example, in relation to the price charged to local shareholders for the use of 
offshore-located intangible assets: such royalties may be artificially inflated to shift 
profits from the shareholder’s country to the CFC’s low-tax jurisdiction92. 
 
Regardless of which analysis is used to define CFC income, such an analysis needs to be 
applied either on an entity-by-entity basis or a transactional basis. On an entity-by-entity basis, 
either all of the entity’s income or none of it, will be attributed to the shareholder depending on 
whether the entity’s total income meets certain threshold criteria before it can be considered 
for inclusion. The transactional basis, on the other hand, considers the characteristic of each 
income stream to determine whether it should be attributed to the shareholder, as defined.93 
 
Once it has been established that a CFC’s income is attributable to the controlling 
party/parties, the amount to be attributed needs to be determined. The tax laws of the 
controlling party/parties’ jurisdiction should be used to calculate the CFC’s income, with 
limitations of losses incurred by the CFC to also be taken into account when performing this 
calculation94. Attribution of the income to the controlling parties should be made in proportion 
to their ownership, over their period of influence. This income would be included as part of 




91 OECD, 2015:47, para 82 
92 OECD, 2015:49, 50, para 87 
93 OECD, 2015:50, 51, para 95 
94 OECD, 2015:57, para 99 
95 OECD, 2015:61, para 110 
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2.3.4. Prevention of double taxation 
There are certain instances which could result in double taxation as a result of the application 
of CFC rules, such as when (i) a CFC’s attributed income is also subject to foreign tax, (ii) 
CFC rules in more than one jurisdiction apply to the attributed income, and/or (iii) a CFC 
distributes attributed income as a dividend96. To reduce the risk of double taxation occurring, 
countries which have adopted CFC legislation must amend their domestic laws and tax 
treaties accordingly. For example, a foreign-tax credit system in the controlling party/parties’ 
jurisdiction would eliminate a double-tax impact in scenarios (i) and (ii) above, while dividends 
under example (iii) could be made exempt if they were already subject to tax in that 
jurisdiction97. 
 
2.3.5. Overview of Action 3 recommendations 
In conclusion, these recommendations aim to deter a CFC’s shareholders from engaging in 
tax-avoidance behaviour98, such as the stripping of a shareholder’s resident-country tax base 
to reduce taxation and the deferral of a resident shareholder’s local-tax liability. From the 
OECD’s perspective, the global adoption of these recommendations would greatly assist in 
reducing the artificial shifting of profits for the purposes of such avoidance. 
 
2.4. SOUTH AFRICA’S CFC FRAMEWORK 
South African CFC rules are largely focussed on acting as a tax-avoidance deterrent99 – an 
objective which is shared by the OECD. The current legislation appears to be in line with the 
rules adopted by many developed countries, to the extent that the legislation is considered to 
be one of the most sophisticated amongst G20 countries100.  
 
The structure of South Africa’s CFC rules, as contained in Section 9D of the ITA, largely follows 
the recommended building blocks set out by the OECD in Action 3. Section 9D defines what 
constitutes control of a CFC, defines CFC income that is required to be attributed to residents 
and how this calculation should be performed, and interacts with the foreign-tax credit 




96 OECD, 2015:65, para 122 
97 OECD, 2015:65, para 123 
98 OECD, 2015:13 
99 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:13 
100 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:6 
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2.4.1. Defining control over a CFC in the context of Section 9D 
A foreign company is defined as a CFC if more than 50% of its participation or voting rights 
are directly or indirectly held by one or more South African residents, regardless of whether 
those residents are connected persons101. Participation rights are defined as rights to receive 
the economic benefits attached to ownership of a share, such that this mirrors legal and 
economic control (for example, equity shares with the right to participate in share capital, 
current or accumulated profits, or reserves, as well as other types of shares, such as 
preference shares102). Voting rights is considered in determining control if a company doesn’t 
have shares but only voting rights103. If a person holds less than 5% of the participation rights 
of the entity, this person will not be considered to be a resident for the purposes of aggregating 
other residents’ ownership in a foreign entity to meet the 50% control requirement.  
 
In effect from 1 January 2018, an additional control consideration is included in the CFC 
definition – the consideration of control based on consolidation in terms of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)104 10, as recommended in BEPS Action 3. The reason 
for this addition was to include entities, other than companies, that are consolidated for 
accounting purposes. This was in response to SARS’ concern that entities other than 
companies (such as foreign trusts) were being used to artificially break the connection 
between a resident and a CFC105. South Africa’s consideration of economic control, legal 
control and control based on consolidation is thus in line with the OECD’s recommendations. 
 
To further address the risk that profits can be made to flow to low-tax jurisdictions to artificially 
reduce the South African tax liability, both a tax rate threshold and a de minimis rule were 
introduced to Section 9D. The tax-rate threshold only considers CFC income for inclusion if 
the foreign tax payable is less than 75%106 of the South African tax that would have been paid 
had the CFC been a resident107. The de minimis rule, on the other hand, includes tainted 
income earned by a CFC from a financial instrument if this exceeds more than 5% of the 
entity’s total receipts and accruals (excluding other specified types of passive income). Section 
 
101 Section 9D(1) 
102 Oguttu, 2007:115 
103 Oguttu, 2007:118 
104 This is an accounting framework that has been globally adopted for financial accounting and 
reporting purposes. 
105 National Treasury, 2017:58 
106 It is proposed that this threshold is revised to 67.5% per the comments noted in the 2019 Draft 
TLAB. 
107 Section 9D(2A)Proviso 
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9D has thus incorporated provisions to make its application more targeted and effective in 
addressing the risk of artificial profit shifting108. 
 
2.4.2. Section 9D’s anti-avoidance considerations and attribution CFC of income 
South Africa uses the categorical analysis approach in which passive forms of income are 
listed as tainted (subject to certain exemptions)109. Tainted income is typically seen as either 
mobile income, which is predominantly made up of passive income (interest, royalties, 
dividends, etc.) or non-commercially sourced income, which is derived through diversionary 
transactions (e.g., the provision of goods or services to a connected person for no commercial 
reason other than to derive a tax benefit)110. These income categories are considered part of 
the resident participation-rights holder’s income, from which net income is determined 
(provided this resident holds at least 10% of the participation rights). Net income, as defined 
in Section 9D(2A), determines the taxable income of a CFC in accordance with specific 
provisions of the ITA, had the CFC been a resident.  
 
Section 9D not only considers the legal classification of income and how related transaction 
parties are, but also the source of the income, as income earned from real economic activity 
in a CFC (i.e., the generation of active income through bona fide business activities in 
competition with other local businesses) is less likely to raise a profit-shifting concern. The 
concept of a foreign business establishment (FBE) is related to this income-source test and 
has been defined in Section 9D. In order for an entity to meet the definition of an FBE, certain 
criteria proving the existence of bona fide business operations need to be met. Thus, from a 
risk-assessment perspective, active income derived from an FBE’s real economic activity is 
not typically considered for attribution111. In certain circumstances, however, even though 
economic activity may exist, tax-avoidance behaviour through the application of non-
commercial and diversionary transactions may arise. Since the CFC rules are aimed at 
deterring such behaviour, Section 9D incorporated specific anti-diversionary rules to prevent 
the artificial movement of profits offshore through non-commercial transactions with connected 
persons112. 
 
Section 9D thus closely follows the Action 3 recommendations by identifying a CFC’s 
attributable income stream on a transaction-by-transaction basis, applying South African tax 
 
108 Section 9D(9A)(a)(iii) 
109 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:28 
110 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:16 
111 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:12 
112 Oguttu, 2007:130 
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laws to determine the taxable income of the CFC (had it been a South African resident) and 
then allocating this income in proportion to the controlling parties’ ownership share over the 
period of influence. Certain anti-avoidance provisions are also incorporated into the legislation 
to penalise non-commercial behaviour through diversionary transactions. 
 
2.4.3. Avoidance of double taxation in the context of Section 9D 
The prevention of double taxation is a key component of Section 9D and is largely in line with 
the Action 3 recommendations. This is seen in the Section’s reference to the tax credit 
available under Section 6quat and the application of DTA provisions where applicable: 
i. Tax credits: If a CFC’s attributed income was also subject to foreign tax, a resident 
can reduce his or her South African taxes payable by applying the tax credit 
available under Section 6quat and thus avoid being taxed twice on the same 
income113.  
ii. DTAs: Section 9D mentions that all attributed income must first be treated in terms 
of the applicable DTA before the CFC attribution rules are applied114. 
 
Instances may also arise in which a foreign subsidiary could be subject to multiple country 
CFC imputation claims and thus multiple instances of taxation (e.g., Country X has a CFC in 
South Africa, which in turn has a CFC in Country Y, and both Country X and South Africa’s 
CFC regimes apply to the CFC in Country Y). The headquarter-company rules in Section 9I 
of the ITA were created specifically for this instance, such that qualifying headquarter 
companies are exempt from CFC rules115. However, should a resident shareholder holding 
multiple layers of CFC entities in various jurisdictions not be classified as a headquarter 
company, the tax-credit methodology should suffice to prevent double taxation. Assuming that 
the relevant jurisdictions apply (Action 3-equivalent) CFC rules, all the CFCs’ income would 
be attributed and taxed at each level. In South Africa, each CFC’s income would be separately 
imputed according to the rules of the ITA. Should any tax be payable, the taxes paid in the 
relevant jurisdictions will be offset against this liability, thereby preventing double taxation. 
South Africa has thus made strides in amending its applicable legislation and DTAs with the 




113 Section 6quat 
114 Section 9D(2A) Proviso 
115 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:34 
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2.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the relaxation of South Africa’s exchange control regulations, a new set of rules 
were required to balance the country’s need to remain competitive on the international stage 
with its need to protect its tax base116. Although their introduction was initially very limited, the 
timing of the introduction of these rules (1997) is interesting, considering that it occurred before 
South Africa’s adoption of a residency tax system (2001) but soon after the country’s return to 
global trade after the 1994 democratic elections117.  
 
It is evident that South Africa has attempted to keep its CFC legislation in line with international 
trends by closely following the BEPS Action 3 recommendations. This is seen in Section 9D’s 
adoption of the recommended control and income attribution considerations, anti-avoidance 
elements, as well as double-taxation prevention provisions. As a result, South Africa’s CFC 
rules are some of the most sophisticated and complex rules among G20 nations, all with the 
purpose of deterring the tax-avoidance behaviour of resident taxpayers. Although the intention 
may have been to adopt international best practice and to remain relevant on the global stage, 
the success of the implementation of the Action 3 recommendations are dependent on the 
global adoption of the recommendations118. These considerations, amongst others, are dealt 




116 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:15 
117 Oguttu, 2007:191 
118 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:12 
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CHAPTER 3: RELEVANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CFC LEGISLATION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF GLOBAL (NON-)ADOPTION 
 
3.1. SOUTH AFRICA – A DEVELOPING NATION ADOPTING FIRST-WORLD LEGISLATION 
In 2001119, South Africa’s tax system was significantly reformed when its income tax policy 
was changed from a source-based to a residence-based tax system. One of the reasons for 
this change was to bring South African policies in line with international standards, and to 
broaden and protect the existing tax base120 (especially in light of the relaxation of exchange 
control regulations). At that stage, South Africa was an inexperienced international market 
participant both from an economic and an international tax standpoint, as it had re-entered the 
international trade arena only post-1994121. 
 
Understandably, South Africa had lagged behind its trading partners on the international tax 
front and thus required the assistance of foreign experts to aid in the development of the 
country’s legislation. When CFC regulations were initially drafted, first-world concepts were 
incorporated into the legislation and limited consideration was given to South Africa’s 
prevailing economic conditions122. 
 
3.1.1. The challenges faced by a developing economy 
Despite the first-world capabilities of South Africa’s economy, it is still regarded as a 
developing country. A key difference between developing and developed countries is that, 
generally, the former are capital importers while the latter are capital exporters123. As such, 
the economic interests of developed and developing countries are poles apart, which results 
in these two categories of countries applying different tax principles to protect their respective 
tax bases (amongst other objectives). Exporters of capital have historically taxed their 
residents’ income to capture the tax on the value derived at the production stage (referred to 
as a residence basis of taxation). This method ensures that offshore revenues earned from 
exported capital are incorporated into the country’s tax net. Capital importers, however, tax 
locally generated sales derived from the use of foreign capital deployed within their borders 
(referred to as the source basis of taxation)124. 
 
119 South Africa, National Treasury, 2000 – The changes from a source-based to a residence-based 
tax system were announced in 2000 and were effective from 1 January 2001. 
120 Nyamongo & Schoeman, 2007:481 
121 Oguttu, 2007:191 
122 Ibid 
123 Oguttu, 2018:315 
124 Ibid 
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The tax revenue collection challenges faced by developing countries in Africa are very different 
from those encountered by developed nations. As developing African countries struggle to 
raise revenues from individual income and consumption taxes, they have become more 
heavily reliant on the generation of revenue from corporate income taxes than their developed 
counterparts125. This is because developing African nations typically rely on the small formal 
sector of those economies to carry their tax bases, as limited tax reporting (caused by the lack 
of financial record keeping and low levels of tax education), non-compliant cultures and 
inadequate resourcing of tax administrations cause a disproportionate dependence on a small 
number of compliant taxpayers126.  
 
Not only do developing countries encounter revenue collection hardships within their own 
borders, but they are subjected to further collection pressures by wealthier trading partners 
when it comes to negotiating cross-border DTAs. DTAs are used to prevent double taxation 
from arising, as well as to ensure that there is balance between a developing nation’s need to 
garner its “fair share” of the tax revenues generated and a foreign investor’s requirement to 
earn a reasonable return from deployed capital127. However, developed countries tend to 
weigh the terms of these treaties in their favour as they often have stronger negotiating 
power128. This has made securing corporate tax collections that much harder for developing 
nations. 
 
3.1.2. The impact of transplanting foreign tax rules to South Africa’s domestic 
legislation 
In 1997, the government incorporated a very limited version of the residence-based CFC 
regime into its domestic legislation (before South Africa changed its own tax system to the 
worldwide basis in 2001). Some may argue that the adoption of these “trial” rules appeared to 
be in haste. The race to adopt international best practice appears to have continued in 
subsequent years, to the extent that South Africa has developed one of the most sophisticated 
and complex set of CFC rules amongst the G20129. It is understandable, however, that SARS 
would want to take steps to ensure the tax base isn’t eroded by tax-avoidance structures, 
considering the country’s dependence on corporates to generate 18% of tax revenues130 
(almost double the average of the corporate collections in developed countries131).  
 
125 Oguttu, 2015:526 
126 Oguttu, 2015:528-529 
127 Oguttu, 2018:315 
128 Ibid 
129 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:3 
130 South Africa, National Treasury & the South African Revenue Service, 2018:vii 
131 Reynolds & Wier, 2018:9 
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As South Africa attempts to position itself as a global competitor, it can’t ignore the impact of 
the international tax system on its domestic legislation. It is on the international stage where 
countries promote themselves to attract investment as they compete with each other for 
mobile capital132 and indirectly for tax revenues (the presence of this additional capital helps 
to grow countries’ economies and thus their tax bases). A common component of international 
taxation is the ability to transplant one country’s tax rules to another133, something which South 
Africa’s CFC rules are no stranger to. South Africa’s international tax rules are considered to 
be complex – both from a legal (i.e., reading and understanding of the law) and an effective 
(i.e., administrative compliance) standpoint134 – partly as a result of these “imported” aspects 
of the legislation135.  
 
This complexity comes from a divergence of general legal systems from domestic tax 
regulations, as the accessory nature of tax laws arising from their reliance on other domestic 
legislation (such as the legal nature of revenue, the definition of a company or whether a 
partnership is a juristic person) means that cross-border interpretations may differ before 
taxation regimes are even considered136. As such, South Africa should be careful to not 
incorporate other countries’ (or even international bodies’) tax concepts too hastily into 
domestic legislation since unnecessary legal and effective complexities could arise. There is 
a risk that such additional complexities could create interpretation confusion, which could 
result in the incorrect taxes being reported or levied.  
 
Just as the transplanting of foreign jurisdictions’ tax laws can create unforeseen complexities, 
the incorporation of accounting concepts into a legal framework has the potential to create 
similar problems. South Africa’s CFC rules make direct reference to the accounting standard, 
IFRS 10, for the purposes of defining a CFC. The insertion was made to expand the CFC 
definition to include entities other than companies that are consolidated for accounting 
purposes (under IFRS 10), to align the legislation with the Action 3 recommendations. South 
Africa’s ITA is complex enough, such that only dedicated tax professionals can understand 
it137: A direct reference to an accounting standard now means that these professionals, as well 
as the revenue authority, must become acquainted with the unfamiliar provisions of IFRS 10. 
This has the potential to become a conflicting area of interpretation, which could cause both 
taxpayers and SARS to apply the legislation incorrectly. 
 
132 Li & Pidduck, 2019:10 
133 Li & Pidduck, 2019:11-12 
134 Li & Pidduck, 2019:5-6 
135 Li & Pidduck, 2019:38 
136 Li & Pidduck, 2019:13 
137 Li & Pidduck, 2019:7 
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CFC rules are considered part of South Africa’s outbound tax policies: Their goal is to facilitate 
the competitiveness of South African outbound investments by preventing double taxation, 
whilst simultaneously combating tax-avoidance practices138. Preventing double taxation 
appears to have been adequately dealt with through the tax credit system in Section 9D, but 
there is an additional risk that excessive taxation may arise if CFC rules are applied too 
stringently. This could ultimately reduce the available cash in, and throttle the competitiveness 
of, South African MNEs. For instance, considering the trend of the reductions in global 
corporate tax rates, the proposed reduction of Section 9D’s 75% tax rate threshold to 67.5% 
may still inappropriately impute income from jurisdictions that aren’t considered to be tax 
havens (such as the UK and US), thereby risking altering the purpose of the CFC rules from 
deterring avoidance to becoming a revenue collection tool139.  
 
Should the CFC rules be turned into a tax collection tool, this would be counter to both the 
purpose of the rules and the country’s tax policy, and damage the growth of corporate South 
Africa. Although this tax threshold concept was adopted in the South African legislation with 
reference to other international regulations, consideration needs to be given to the effect the 
country’s high corporate tax rate may have on the application of this exemption. South Africa 
thus needs to adjust its focus to protecting its economic interests140 by carefully considering 
how international tax recommendations (such as the BEPS Action Plan) should be applied to 
its domestic legislation. 
 
Transplanting other regions’ tax rules without due consideration of their impact on the legal 
and effective complexities of the ITA risks creating an incorrect assessment of taxpayer 
income. The risk of overtaxation as a result of overly stringent CFC legislation is of greater 
import, considering the adverse impact this could have on South African MNE growth and 
international competitiveness.   
 
3.2. BEPS AND THE POLITICAL WILL TO INITIATE GLOBAL ADOPTION 
The BEPS project is not the first OECD initiative aimed at curtailing BEPS behaviour. During 
the 1990s, the European Union (EU) raised its concern about the depletion of certain member 
countries’ tax bases through CFCs’ strategic use of other member countries’ tax rules, with 
the purpose of exploiting these other jurisdictions’ lower tax rates141. Off the back of this, the 
OECD issued a Report on Harmful Tax Competition in 1998, which included recommendations 
 
138 Li & Pidduck, 2019:21 
139 OECD, 2015:13 
140 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:3 
141 Oguttu, 2015:522 
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for anti-avoidance measures to curb such offshore avoidance. However, the political will to 
implement these recommendations into enforceable legislation didn’t materialise142. 
 
After the global financial crisis, however, the political stance on anti-avoidance appeared to 
change when politicians were faced with public outrage against MNEs’ abusive use of tax-
planning schemes. In reaction to this, G20 politicians initiated the BEPS project and charged 
the OECD with tackling this problem – a perceived “win” for the OECD which had tried to 
obtain political support for such a reform for many years143. However, in its quest to 
revolutionise international tax policies, the OECD found itself in hot water by being accused of 
bias towards the agendas of developed nations144. For instance, when the global financial 
crisis saw many European nations revert to being capital importers (something which 
developing nations had been for years prior to this crisis), it was suggested that the BEPS 
project was merely reactionary to the needs of those nations to aid the stimulation of revenues 
for their benefit145. 
 
Questions were also raised as to whether the proposed strengthening of existing anti-
avoidance provisions (as suggested under the Action Plan) would be instrumental in 
preventing BEPS, considering that taxpayers had been manipulating these provisions for 
years, rendering them virtually ineffective146. Furthermore, BEPS issues faced by developing 
countries aren’t only as a result of legal loopholes exploited by MNEs but also due to illicit 
capital outflows. Such unlawful behaviour won’t be fixed by strengthening legislation, but 
rather through the implementation of criminal sanctions147.  
 
In the context of the Action 3 recommendations, the best anti-shifting results would come from 
a universal strengthening of CFC legislation. To test the adoption of these recommendations, 
consideration has been given to the outlook on these proposals by two of the world’s largest 
developed economies, the US and the UK. Considering only limited worldwide adoption has 
taken place148, South Africa should consider the effectiveness its existing CFC rules has in 
achieving its anti-avoidance objective. Developing nations, like South Africa, should consider 
waiting for concepts to be tried and tested on the international stage before implementing them 
 
142 Oguttu, 2015:523 
143 Brauner, 2016:989 
144 Oguttu, 2015:541  
145 Ibid 
146 Ibid 
147 Oguttu, 2015:533 
148 Deloitte.com, 2017d – The Deloitte Action 3 Implementation report lists jurisdictions according to 
whether they have or haven’t adopted CFC legislation. According to this list, 36 countries have CFC 
rules. However, not all of these countries’ rules are of the same standard as the Action 3 
recommendations. 
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in their domestic legislation. However, the outcome of such a trial period can only be examined 
if these BEPS recommended policies were (ever) universally adopted. 
 
3.2.1. How the “double Irish with a Dutch sandwich” scheme achieved foreign to 
foreign base-stripping149 
Even though the BEPS project actions supposedly have political backing in many G20 nations 
to strengthen domestic anti-avoidance legislation, certain anomalies still openly exist in first-
world taxing systems that allow MNEs to pay negligible amounts of tax. 
 
The “double Irish with a Dutch sandwich” manoeuvre, which was used by many US tech 
companies (such as Apple, Google and Microsoft)150, is an example of what the BEPS project 
was designed to prevent. From an American perspective, this tax-avoidance scheme made 
use of cross-border loopholes through a creative combination of the US’ Subpart F exemptions 
(i.e., the exemptions in its CFC-equivalent legislation), favourable EU treaties and the 0% tax 
rate available in tax havens. This scheme allowed Apple and Google to achieve incredibly low 
effective tax rates of 2% and 2.4% respectively151, for instance.  
 
Essentially, the scheme took advantage of the 0% royalty withholding tax agreement between 
Ireland and the Netherlands, and exploited an Irish residency loophole which based the 
residency of Irish companies on the place where management and control was exercised (not 
necessarily where an entity was incorporated). In order to take advantage of this, a US parent 
company would firstly relocate its sales-generating intellectual property (IP) from the US (a 
high-tax jurisdiction) to a tax haven by sharing the IP development costs with this “paper 
subsidiary”. This allowed the US parent company to pay “costs” to this subsidiary and enable 
the sharing of royalties earned in proportion to this cost-sharing arrangement. The next step 
would be to set up another entity incorporated in Ireland that was managed and controlled in 
a tax haven (for Irish tax purposes, this entity would be seen to be resident in the tax haven). 
Bona fide sales income would then be earned by a separate Irish entity (a true Irish tax resident 
company). By setting up IP sublicencing agreements between these group entities and a 
Dutch middleman, the sales income would morph into royalty income, be routed through the 
Netherlands (where the withholding tax rate between Ireland and the Netherlands was 0%), 
and ultimately find its way to the Irish-incorporated company’s tax haven, where it wouldn’t be 
 
149 OECD, 2015:13 – Foreign to foreign base stripping is defined as the simultaneous stripping of a 
MNE’s resident country’s tax base and other countries’ tax bases. 
150 Burkadze, 2016:367 
151 Burkadze, 2016:367 
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subject to Irish tax.152 The result of this structure was that none of the royalty revenues were 
subjected to tax in a high-tax jurisdiction (the US), while most of the revenues were taxed in a 
low-tax jurisdiction (Ireland) or weren’t taxed at all when they were rerouted to the tax haven 
(either through the separate Irish entity and/or through the cost-sharing arrangement between 
the US and the paper subsidiary in the first tax haven). This is the type of foreign to foreign 
base-stripping behaviour that the BEPS Action 3 recommendations strive to avoid.  
 
It was only a matter of time before the arrangement of such a tax-saving magnitude would 
attract the attention of government officials. In 2013, Tim Cook (chief executive of Apple) 
testified before an investigative subcommittee of the US Senate to explain Apple’s avoidance 
of US taxes, which in turn sparked a series of investigations into the avoidance structure153. 
After mounting public pressure, the Irish government amended its legislation (effective from 
2020) to prevent its tax laws from being used to support cross-border base erosion through 
the “double Irish” structure154. Apple was also rapped over the knuckles by the European 
Commission (EC) for its dealings in Ireland where it was required to pay €14.5 billion plus 
interest in unpaid taxes garnered from 2003 to 2014155. This fine wasn’t related to the “double 
Irish with a Dutch sandwich” scheme156, but rather to “illegal deals” between Apple and the 
Irish government157 (these deals saw Apple’s Irish operating companies pay tax below the 
Irish statutory tax rate on all EU sales income158). Agreements like these showcase both the 
corporate and governmental disregard for anti-avoidance legislation and principles. 
 
3.2.2. US tax amendments not in line with BEPS recommendations 
With the “double Irish” tax-avoidance scheme out in the open, one would think that American 
politicians were motivated to bring these lost taxes back to the US by driving legislative 
changes.  
 
In December 2017, US lawmakers reduced the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% and 
simultaneously introduced tax reforms that were supposedly designed to incentivise US MNEs 
to stop their use of offshore tax-avoidance structures159. One of the reforms introduced was 
the Global Intangible Low-taxed Income (GILTI) provision, which taxes US parent companies 
(at a rate of 10.5%) on offshore subsidiary profits that exceed a 10% return on offshore tangible 
 
152 Burkadze, 2016:367-371 
153 Bowers & Drucker, 2017 
154 Ibid 
155 Wang, 2018:540 
156 Wang, 2018:542 
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investments160. US parent companies can claim a foreign tax credit against the GILTI tax in 
respect of foreign taxes paid on these profits161. The amendments also made provision for the 
tax-free repatriation of dividends from profits generated offshore, even if those dividends 
weren’t ever subject to foreign tax162. An additional rule, the Foreign Derived Intangible Income 
(FDII) provision, was introduced to give US companies a favourable tax rate on their income 
derived from exports163. This was to supposedly incentivise US MNEs to bring their IP back 
into the US to allow them to take advantage of favourable tax rates on the export of their IP-
related services164. 
 
These reforms have been criticised for encouraging MNEs to continue to use offshore tax-
avoidance structures rather than to change their behaviour, thus bringing into question the 
legislation’s supposed purpose to discourage tax-avoidance behaviour in the first place165. For 
instance, MNEs can determine whether they meet the 10% threshold for offshore returns by 
increasing their offshore cost base. This can be achieved by shifting US operations to the 
relevant foreign jurisdictions. As US tax won’t be payable if a MNE’s foreign return is less than 
this 10% threshold, and considering that this return can be manipulated, the incentive to bring 
these lost offshore profits back to the US is diminished. Even when the 10% threshold is 
exceeded, offshore profits are subject to the already low 10.5% GILTI tax, which can be 
eroded further if any foreign tax credits are applied against the US tax payable. The likely 
outcome is minimal tax dollars being collected in the US, combined with a potentially adverse 
impact on the US economy and job creation. To add fuel to the fire, the exemption of 
repatriated dividends (on which the tax was effectively the last barrier to profit-shifting before 
the amendments came into effect) has provided further incentive for US MNEs to continue 
utilising their offshore tax-efficient structures to deliver tax-free returns to their US 
shareholders166.  
 
The FDII provision, which was designed to work with the GILTI provision in bringing back US-
developed IP and providing MNEs with favourable exporting tax rates, is also unlikely to have 
its desired effect. This is because MNEs still derive a larger tax benefit from keeping their IP 
offshore, even after taking these new reforms into account167. 
 
160 Avi-Yonah, 2018 
161 Walters, 2018 
162 Avi-Yonah, 2018 
163 Avi-Yonah, 2018 – These favourable export taxes were found to be in violation of the World Trade 
Organisation’s export subsidy rules. 
164 Walters, 2018 
165 Ibid 
166 Avi-Yonah, 2018 
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US politicians caved to public pressure to address the blatant tax-avoidance techniques 
adopted by many US MNEs, yet this didn’t render any tax-avoidance transformation. The 
GILTI and FDII workarounds illustrate how ineffective these recent reforms have been in the 
fight against profit shifting and foreign to foreign base-stripping. The implementation of such 
weak CFC standards is counter-productive to the deterrents implemented by other nations to 
tackle profit shifting, as this merely encourages tax-rate reductions and spurs on the race to 
the corporate-tax bottom168. In terms of its approach to working with fellow BEPS project 
countries to curb tax avoidance, it comes as no surprise that the US has resisted the adoption 
of the BEPS Actions, despite being involved in their development. The US has a history of 
avoiding ties to international tax norms by instead adopting rules and regulations that 
Congress believes will work best for America169. 
 
3.2.3. Recent amendments to the UK’s CFC rules 
The US isn’t the only major economy to have amended its CFC-equivalent rules to make its 
international tax system more competitive. The UK reformed its CFC regulations with effect 
from 1 January 2013, hoping it would encourage MNEs to set up their headquarters in the 
UK170. This strategy incorporated the adoption of various exemption categories, such as171: 
i. A full exemption during the first 12 months after the CFC becomes UK-controlled; 
ii. A full exemption if the CFC resides in one of the specified excluded territories 
(these are mostly countries that have a tax rate of at least 75% of the UK’s); 
iii. A full exemption if the CFC’s local taxes paid are at least 75% of the UK tax rate; 
and 
iv. A full exemption if the CFC is considered to generate low profits172.  
 
Certain business profits of a CFC are also exempt if the CFC is considered to generate bona 
fide trading income173. The updated rules also incorporated a “CFC charge gateway” test, 
whereby CFC profits that are seen to “pass through the gateway” are subject to UK tax. This 
 
168 Kadet & Picciotto, 2015:1 
169 Maine, 2017:267 
170 Smith, 2013:127 
171 Smith, 2013:127 
172 Smith, 2013:127 – Low profits are considered to occur (i) if accounting profits are less than 
£50 000, (ii) if accounting profits don’t exceed £500 000 and non-trading income is less than £50 000 
and (iii) if accounting profits don’t exceed 10% of the entity’s operating expenditure. 
173 Smith, 2013:128 – All of the following conditions must be met in order for these business profits to 
be exempt: (i) The CFC operates from physical business premises; (ii) no more than 20% of the 
CFC’s trading income and 20% of its salary expenses is derived from the UK and is paid to UK staff 
respectively; (iii) less than 20% of the CFC’s exports are to the UK; and (iv) any income earned by the 
CFC from IP that was transferred to the CFC by a UK related party within the last six years, provided 
there wasn’t a significant reduction in the UK related party’s value. 
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test assesses the source of a CFC’s capital174 from which it generates income, the purpose 
for a CFC’s existence175, and indications of external control in relation to the generation of the 
CFC’s profits176. If a CFC is generating income from UK-sourced capital, the purpose for the 
generation of certain CFC profits is to reduce UK or foreign taxes and/or there is strong 
evidence of external control over a particular aspect of the CFC’s operations, then the CFC’s 
profits are considered to “pass through the gateway”. The profits will then be apportioned and 
taxed in the hands of the UK shareholders.  
 
Not all income “passing through the gateway” are subject to UK tax, however. If a CFC 
generates bona fide trading profits or earns dividend income by holding shares in group-
controlled subsidiaries, and it also earns non-trading finance income which may be considered 
to have “passed through the gateway”, the finance income is exempt when it is less than 5% 
of the entity’s total income (known as the de minimis rule)177. In addition to this, the UK created 
a special exemption for CFCs operating as MNE group financing companies178. These entities 
may elect whether 0%179 or 25%180 of their total financing income earned from the provision 
of inter-group loans can be subjected to taxation. This choice, which must be performed 
annually, can be made regardless of whether this financing income was derived from UK-
related activities or from the use of UK-connected capital. Without this exemption option, all 
such financing income would “pass through the gateway” and be fully taxable in the UK. This 
group financing exemption was welcomed by MNEs when it was introduced, as it was 
anticipated that this exemption would aid UK MNEs in expanding their operations overseas181. 
 
In comparison to South Africa’s CFC rules182, the UK’s aren’t considered to be as 
aggressive183, largely because the UK’s CFC rules provide a far wider scope for CFC 
exemptions than the South African legislation. For instance, the only comparable exemptions 
 
174 Smith, 2013:128 – This considers the extent of “free-capital” contributions made by way of UK-
sourced equity funding. 
175 Smith, 2013:128 – Consideration is given to whether the CFC was created to derive a tax benefit. 
176 Smith, 2013:128 – This considers whether significant UK control over and management of the 
CFC’s assets/risks exists, or whether the CFC is dependent on third-party assistance for the 
management of UK assets/risks. 
177 Smith, 2013:129 
178 Smith, 2013:129 
179 Smith, 2013:129 – The full exemption can be elected if the CFC’s own local assets or new group 
capital is specified and identified as the source of funding. The choice needs to be made for each 
individual loan (or part thereof) provided by the group financing company. 
180 Smith, 2013:129 – The partial exemption may be chosen if no consideration is to be given to the 
source of the CFC’s funds. The choice needs to be made for each individual loan (or part thereof) 
provided by the group financing company. 
181 Smith, 2013:131 
182 Appendix I includes a high-level comparison between the South African, UK and US (and 
Brazilian) CFC rules. 
183 Davis Tax Committee, 2016:12 
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in the South African and UK CFC legislation are those relating to the purpose test (one of the 
requirements of the “CFC charge gateway” test is that the purpose of the CFC isn’t to create 
a tax benefit), the de minimis rule (according to which less than 5% of total income is 
attributable to non-trading finance income), the business-profits test (whether a CFC 
participates in bona fide profit-generating activities) and the tax-rate threshold consideration 
(whether a CFC’s local taxes are at least 75% of the taxes that would be payable in the 
controlling shareholders’ resident country). Most notably, South African legislation doesn’t 
include any provisions like the UK’s group financing provision – a key tool that has aided the 
growth of the UK’s MNEs. It is an interesting observation that the UK’s CFC rules, whilst not 
being as stringent South Africa’s, are considered to be broadly consistent with the BEPS 
Action 3 recommendations184.  
 
3.2.4. BEPS, Brexit and the EU crossfire 
The UK’s group financing exemption doesn’t impute a UK CFC charge on the profits earned 
by foreign group financing companies185 (more often than not, these entities would be located 
in low-tax jurisdictions and have favourable DTAs in place with all other jurisdictions in which 
other group subsidiaries are located186). The UK revenue authorities justified this exemption 
by stating that it addressed “the difficult issues which arise as a result of the fungibility of 
money within a multinational group. The rules represent to a large extent a proxy for 
establishing the exact source and history of a group’s financing arrangements and the extent 
these are borne by the UK.”187 
 
Despite the UK’s perceived compliance with the Action 3 recommendations, this didn’t stop 
the EC from commencing an investigation in 2017 into whether the UK’s group financing 
exemption constituted state aid188. It is alleged that the investigation may have been prompted 
by the Paradise Papers scandal and that media coverage of the leaks highlighted a group 
financing structure of a particular UK MNE, whereby loans were advanced to German group 
companies from the UK via an Isle of Man financing conduit189. In 2019, the EC concluded its 
investigation and found that only certain aspects of the exemption constituted unlawful state 
aid:  
 
184 PWC.co.uk, 2015:2 
185 Habershon, McKnight & Theodoiou, 2019 
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187 Habershon, et al., 2019 
188 Habershon, et al., 2019 – State aid happens when “a company which receives government support 
gains an advantage over its competitors” such that the “…state measure… [is] selective [and] it must 
favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”. Under EU law, state aid is unlawful as 
a result of the competitive distortion it creates in the market. 
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i. Aspects of the exemption relating to the generation of finance income from UK-
connected capital are justified (as this avoids burdensome tracing exercises 
required to assess the exact amount of profits derived from the provision of such 
UK assets)190; 
ii. The exemption is justified if a CFC’s profits were not derived from UK activities; and 
iii. The exemption of a CFC’s income that was derived from profit-generating activities 
performed in the UK constitutes state aid191. The provision of these tax benefits was 
also found to not be available to third-party financiers192.  
 
The impact of the ruling was that the UK government was required to recover the taxes owed 
to it by the UK MNEs that had benefitted from this aspect of the UK CFC regulations193. In 
response to this, the UK applied to the EU courts for an annulment of the EC’s ruling on the 
basis that the ruling misunderstood how the UK’s CFC rules worked194. In the interim, however, 
the UK has amended its CFC rules (with effect from 1 January 2019) to ensure that the 
exemption isn’t available to CFC profits derived from UK activities195. This ruling showcases 
the variation in opinion between the EU and the UK with regards to what constitutes a state-
provided tax benefit in the context of these regions’ CFC regimes. There is a possibility that 
these interpretations may again change as the outcome of revisiting these interpretations 
through the UK’s EU court applications is yet to be seen. Such fluidity highlights the impact 
different interpretations can have, which ultimately leads to confusion, especially in the context 
of the OECD’s encouragement of global Action 3 adoption. 
 
In light of the above, there appears to be a consistent theme of tax-reform confusion in both 
the UK and the US. American politicians introduced CFC tax reforms which promised to 
change the tax-avoidance behaviour of US MNEs, whilst the UK government pledged to work 
with the OECD to ensure that the UK tax laws “do not allow or encourage multinational 
enterprises to cut their tax bills by artificially shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions”196. From 
the above synopses detailing the US’ GILTI and FDII provisions, as well as the UK’s group 
financing exemptions, there is little evidence that the tax-avoidance changes promised by 
politicians in the US and the UK will become a reality. This is further exacerbated by 
speculation that the UK government is considering implementing a “Singapore-on-Thames” 
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tax-haven strategy to stimulate growth in a post-Brexit economy197. If such a race to the 
corporate-tax bottom was to be started by the UK’s post-Brexit government, it would be in 
direct contravention of the OECD recommendations which that same government had pledged 
to adhere to. These mixed signals call into question whether there is the political will to enact 
true anti-avoidance tax reform. 
 
3.3. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The OECD has noted that the struggle against BEPS requires a global solution, as the use of 
outdated strategies combined with a lack of domestic coordination could render any attempts 
to prevent this avoidance behaviour ineffective198. As BEPS is often achieved through the use 
of complicated cross-border structures by MNEs, and considering that the Action 3 
recommendations need to be enacted in domestic law in order for them to have the “teeth” of 
enforceability, global adoption of the recommendations may aid the fight against this tax-
avoidance behaviour. Despite this objective, it appears that major first-world countries, such 
as the US and the UK, haven’t taken the Action 3 recommendations, and its principles, to 
heart. Amendments that have been made to the US’ Subpart F legislation don’t appear to 
target MNEs’ elaborate tax-avoidance structures nor do they deter these MNEs from entering 
into tax-avoidance arrangements. If anything, the US legislation protects these MNEs from 
paying tax at the “normal” rate, which gives them an international competitive edge. The UK’s 
perception that its 2013 reforms to CFC legislation (which was designed to attract international 
businesses to the UK) didn’t constitute harmful, anti-competitive practices (by aligning itself 
with the Action 3 recommendations), conflicted with the EC’s interpretation. This interpretation 
mismatch has created confusion, yet the final outcome is still to be determined.  
 
The tax-reform confusion created by UK and US politicians casts doubt over whether these 
major global economies will ever adhere to the Action 3 recommendations requiring the 
strengthening of the CFC provisions. Furthermore, the US and UK’s prioritisation of domestic 
corporate incentives risks spurring on the race to the corporate-tax bottom, in which 
developing nations will be the losers (largely because of their weakened bargaining power 
when it comes to the pressure of offering corporate-tax incentives).  
 
As South Africa is a developing country which places a greater reliance on revenue collections 
from corporate-income tax than its developed counterparts, one can understand why the 
revenue authority would not want to waste any time in preventing a drop in these collections 
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by implementing anti-avoidance measures. However, hasty implementation may not help this 
cause. Caution must be taken to ensure that the existing rules aren’t used as a tax collection 
tool, considering the recent amendments to the tax-rate exemption threshold in light of the 
worldwide decrease in corporate tax rates. In addition, seeing that the US, the UK and other 
BRICS countries (as addressed in Chapter 5) are holding back on the implementation of the 
Action 3 recommendations, it may not be ideal for a developing country, like South Africa, to 
be a leading adopter of these recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 4: TP VERSUS CFCS – THE REPORTING AND ARM’S LENGTH 
OVERLAP 
 
4.1. THE PURPOSE OF DETERRING AVOIDANCE BEHAVIOUR 
As briefly outlined in Chapter 1, CFC rules were introduced into South African legislation to 
prevent the erosion of the local tax base (and the resultant deferral of tax on income earned 
offshore) caused by shifting capital offshore to low-tax jurisdictions. The ultimate purpose of 
the rules was to discourage residents from creating complex foreign corporate structures to 
effect a shift in their capital, and from indefinitely deferring taxation on offshore income. In 
order to achieve this, the rules eliminated the incentives for taxpayers to transfer profits to low-
tax jurisdictions by imputing such income into the South African tax net (and effectively taxing 
it at a higher rate). 
 
TP legislation is another type of anti-avoidance mechanism that was incorporated into the ITA 
to combat BEPS – these rules attempt to regulate profit shifting by ensuring that prices at 
which goods and services are transferred are at arm’s length199. One of the ways in which 
MNEs shift profits is by manipulating inter-group cross-border prices charged for goods and 
services, as well as for the functions and risks associated therewith, with the objective of 
reducing the group’s overall tax liability (for instance, by increasing expenditure in high-tax 
countries to create income in low-tax jurisdictions)200.  
 
Another common tactic is for MNEs to relocate valuable IP to low-tax jurisdictions. Market-
comparable royalty payments for specific-firm IP are often difficult to estimate, so MNEs mask 
their value through relocation to further distort cross-border pricing201. TP legislation was 
introduced to deter such pricing manipulation by ensuring that these cross-border transactions 
take place at the same price and on the same terms as they would have had the parties not 
been related202.  
 
In recent years, the reporting obligations of large MNEs has intensified through the enactment 
of enhanced transparency requirements which necessitate the submission of additional TP 
documentation when certain threshold levels are met (such as the submission of a master file, 
local file and CbC report as recommended in Action 13)203. The reason for requiring these 
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additional submissions was to enhance transparency for tax administrators: By understanding 
an MNE’s global activities, having sight of its global income streams, and knowing where its 
taxes are paid (all of which would be disclosed as part of these requirements) revenue 
authorities are better equipped to identify BEPS risks204.  
 
CFC rules prevent profit-shifting behaviour through the reinstatement of taxing rights to a 
foreign entity’s resident shareholder, by capturing income that might not have been earned by 
the CFC had the transfer price of the CFC’s income-earning capital been at arm’s length205. 
TP rules prevent this same behaviour by, on the other hand, enforcing the restoration of a 
cross-border arm’s length normality. An overlap of purpose appears to exist between these 
two anti-avoidance methods, although the mechanics behind how these two aspects of 
legislation achieve this purpose somewhat differs. 
 
4.2. COMPLEX AND DETAILED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR GLOBAL SOUTH 
AFRICAN TAXPAYERS 
An increase in the complexity and volume of cross-border intra-group trade, combined with a 
shortfall in tax revenues following the global financial crisis, has heightened revenue 
authorities’ scrutiny. This has resulted in intensified compliance requirements (most notably 
TP reporting requirements as laid out in Action 13) as well as increased compliance costs for 
taxpayers 206. Legislating the requirement for MNEs to disclose information about their global 
operations to revenue authorities is an important move in deterring profit shifting, as having a 
bird’s eye view of an MNE’s global operations yields a host of unprecedented benefits in 
combating tax avoidance. This is especially relevant in a South African context, considering 
that the largest 10% of foreign-owned entities account for 98% of profits shifted to low-tax 
jurisdictions or tax havens207. 
 
4.2.1. TP reporting amendments as recommended in BEPS Action 13 
The South African TP rules are embedded within Section 31 of the ITA and are based on the 
OECD’s arm’s length standard208. Although this section is concerned with TP, no definition is 
in fact provided for this term – the section is instead titled “Tax payable in respect of 
international transactions to be based on arm’s length principle”. Section 31 applies to 
“affected transactions”, when any terms/conditions of direct or indirect transactions entered 
 
204 OECD, 2015b:9 
205 Burkdaze, 2016:373 
206 OECD, 2015b:11 
207 Reynolds & Wier, 2018:2 
208 Thomson Reuters, 2018 
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into between connected persons209 aren’t considered to be standard commercial terms 
(standard commercial terms are those that would apply if unconnected parties were 
transacting). If a transaction is not considered to be at arm’s length, a taxpayer must, when 
filing an income tax return, adjust the transfer price to an arm’s length amount (this is known 
as the “primary adjustment”). Non-compliance with the arm’s length provision of the section 
attracts a charge known as the “secondary adjustment” which deems the value of the primary 
adjustment to be treated as a dividend, on which the dividend tax rate of 20% (per Section 64) 
is applied210. If a TP adjustment is required, the allocation of taxable profits between South 
Africa and the other transaction countries are determined with reference to the applicable 
DTAs in place211. In terms of monitoring the reporting requirements of this section, sections 
25 and 29 of the Tax Administration Act (TAA) govern TP documentary submissions with 
regards to the CbC report and TP documentation retentions respectively. 
 
To allow SARS to determine whether these transactions were at market-related prices, MNEs 
are required to submit extensive documentation justifying the adoption of pricing assumptions 
applied to these transactions. The requirement for the submission of mandatory documents to 
SARS (depending on whether certain requirements are met) relating to an MNE’s cross-border 
related-party transactions was gazetted in 2016, and by 2017 an external business 
requirements specifications (BRS) document was issued to regulate the content of these 
documents. The submission requirements came into effect for years of assessment 
commencing on or after 1 January 2016. MNEs are required to file the new mandatory Action 
13 documents within 12 months after their year-end212. 
 
The enhanced cross-border reporting requirements that arose from the introduction of CbC 
reports, master files and local files (as well as additions to the corporate income tax return), 
are explored below. The details required from taxpayers in these reports are further 
considered with a view to assessing their impact on the TP and anti-BEPS objective. 
 
4.2.1.1. CbC reports 
The CbC report is part of Action 13’s three-tiered approach to standardising TP 
documentation. The key objective of this report is to provide high-level operational and 
 
209 A connected person is defined in Section 1 of the ITA. In the case of an MNE, connected persons 
include members of a group who have a common shareholding of at least 50% as well as entities in 
which it has a 20% minimum holding, provided other shareholders don’t own the majority of voting 
rights. 
210 It should be noted that since this is a secondary adjustment rather than a true dividend as defined, 
the 20% dividend tax rate applied will not be reduced by the applicable DTAs. 
211 Thomson Reuters, 2018 
212 Mazars.co.za, 2019 
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economic information to SARS to allow for a South African assessment of BEPS and TP risks. 
The report is in line with the Action 13 recommended template213 (using a template ensures 
that all cross-border information is provided in the same format to allow for ease of cross-
border transmission and comparison214).  
 
The South African CbC regulations only apply to MNE groups215 that have total consolidated 
revenue of more than R10 billion (€750 million) and need to be filed by an MNE group’s head 
office in its resident jurisdiction. In order to effect the Action 13 recommendations for CbC 
reporting into South African legislation, amendments to the TAA were enacted in 2015, which 
incorporated a new definition of “international tax standard” in Section 1 (this refers to the 
South African CbC regulations, which emulate Action 13). In addition to these legislative 
changes, treaty amendments were also required, as a key element of CbC reporting includes 
sharing this information with other revenue authorities outside South Africa. In 2016, South 
Africa signed a multilateral competent authority agreement, which laid the groundwork to allow 
South Africa to receive CbC reports216. SARS also has the power to share these reports with 
other countries as prescribed in Section 3 of the TAA – if SARS is under obligation in terms of 
an international agreement to exchange information with other revenue authorities, it must do 
so either automatically (in the case of CbC reports) or on request (in the case of master and 
local files)217. 
 
In order to provide SARS with the required CbC report, an MNE group must submit the 
specified information using the CBC01 form218. The form requires the entity’s details (name, 
company registration number, tax number and address), total group revenue (split between 
revenues earned between related and unrelated parties), total group profits, total group 
income tax paid and accrued, stated capital, group accumulated earnings, total group assets 
and total number of group employees219. The form also requires information on “constituent 
entities”220, including all constituent entities’ details (name, company registration number, tax 
number and address), and information on business activities conducted221. The information 
 
213 See the example of the Action 13 recommended template in Appendix II  
214 South Africa, South African Revenue Service [SARS], 2017:12 
215 SARS, 2017:11 – Note that a “group of companies” as defined in Section 1 is not the same as an 
MNE group as defined in the South African CbC regulations. While a group of companies may 
constitute an MNE group, an MNE group is required to have consolidated revenue in excess of  
R10 billion (€750 million). 
216 SARS, 2017:9-10 
217 SARS, 2017:14 
218 SARS, 2018:4-5 
219 SARS, 2018:11-16 
220 SARS, 2017:4 – These are separate business units of an MNE group that have been consolidated 
into the group’s financial statements. 
221 SARS, 2018:16-19 
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required in the CBC01 form closely follows the Action 13 recommendations for CbC reports. 
Extracts of both these reports have been included in Appendix II for illustrative purposes. 
 
All MNEs that submit CbC information are also required to submit master files and local files 
(described below). As the threshold for filing a CbC report is a lot higher than the threshold 
required for filing master and local files, there may be instances where an MNE group is 
required to submit master and local files whilst not being required to submit a CbC report. 
 
4.2.1.2. Master files 
The master file serves the same purpose as the CbC report by enabling SARS and other 
revenue authorities to assess BEPS and TP risks. The file is typically prepared by the MNE 
group’s head office (from where it is then made available to all MNE group entities) and 
includes high-level information that highlights the MNE’s global TP practices222.  
 
As noted above, a master file (and a local file) must be submitted when an MNE group meets 
the CbC reporting threshold requirements. However, if a CbC report is not required, a master 
file (and a local file) still need to be submitted when the quantum of related-party transactions 
is in excess of R100 million223. 
 
Unlike the CbC report, a master file (and local file) template hasn’t been prescribed and MNEs 
are required to use their judgement in determining the appropriate level of detail to be 
disclosed224. The following information is required, at a minimum, in justifying adopted inter-
group policies225: 
i. Organisational structure: This includes an organogram of the group’s corporate 
structure, as well as information on the geographical location of the various group 
entities. 
ii. Description of the MNE group’s business(es): This includes an overview of the 
group’s supply chain, including the five largest products/services by revenue, 
coupled with any other products/services making up more than 5% of turnover 
(noting the main geographic markets for these products/services), service 
agreements between various group entities, including pricing policies and service 
costs, and a brief overview of value-creating entities based on inputs received. A 
 
222 SARS, 2017:15 
223 Mazars.co.za, 2019 
224 SARS, 2017:19 
225 SARS, 2017:29-30 
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description of recent material acquisitions, disposals, restructuring transactions and 
other corporate activity undertaken would also need to be disclosed. 
iii. MNE intangibles: This includes a description of the overall strategy relating to the 
development of intangible assets, as well as the management and location of the 
research and development facilities linked to these intangibles. A list of intangibles 
that are important for TP purposes (including a brief description of how these assets 
affect TP policies), as well as relevant cost-contribution and/or licencing 
agreements will also need to be disclosed. If there have been any transfers in 
ownership amongst group entities, the entities, countries and pricing involved will 
also need to be noted. 
iv. MNE inter-company financial activities: An overview of how the group is financed 
must be provided, including a description of financing terms and policies between 
group entities, as well as whether the group makes use of a central treasury 
function (noting the treasury function’s resident country, as well as details regarding 
its effective management).  
v. MNE financial and tax positions: This includes the MNE group’s annual financial 
statements (AFS) as well as a brief summary and listing of the group’s unilateral 
advance-pricing agreements, as well as tax rulings relating to the allocation of 
income across various countries. 
 
4.2.1.3. Local files 
The local file is required from individual MNE group entities. It provides more detailed 
information relating to specific inter-company transactions and supplements the information 
provided in the master file. The file focuses on cross-border transactions between connected 
persons for the purpose of performing TP analyses (i.e., assessing whether these transactions 
have complied with the arm’s length principle)226.  
 
The threshold requirements for local file submission have been laid out in Section 4.2.1.2. 
above and the following information (as stipulated by the BRS) must be included227: 
i. Local entity: Information on the entity’s management structure (including foreign 
persons to whom local management reports and their locations), details about key 
competitors and disclosure of the entity’s strategies are required. 
 
226 SARS, 2017:15 
227 SARS, 2017:31-32 
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ii. Financial information: This includes the local entity’s AFS (preferably audited), as 
well as illustrations showing how financial data applied in TP methods agrees with 
this financial information. 
iii. Controlled transactions: The list noted in the BRS is extensive. In summary, 
disclosure should include copies of intra-group agreements, a description of and 
amounts of intra-group transactions and related payments and receipts, an 
overview of assumptions adopted in determining TP methodology and descriptions 
or reasons for asserting that relevant transactions were concluded on an arm’s 
length basis. Uni-, bi- and multilateral advance-pricing agreements, as well as other 
tax rulings in which South Africa is not a party, should also be disclosed. 
 
4.2.1.4. Other submission requirements 
Although some MNEs may not be required to submit master and local files to SARS because 
they don’t meet the threshold requirements, it is strongly advised that documents in line with 
the master and local file formats are kept on hand upon the filing of an income tax return 
should SARS conduct a TP audit (in these circumstances SARS would require a taxpayer to 
submit the requested TP information within 21 days)228. This is in line with Section 29 of the 
TAA, which requires taxpayers to keep records, books of account or documents on hand. 
 
All corporate taxpayers are also required to disclose the nature of their cross-border related-
party transactions, as well as income received or expenditure incurred in relation to these 
transactions, on their income tax returns (known as the ITR14 form), even if they don’t submit 
a master or local file. The return requires the disclosure of various financial ratios (such as 
debt to equity and debt to EBITDA229), as well as the answering of various compliance 
questions (such as whether TP documentation exists to support these transactions, whether 
any of the abovementioned transactions occurred in tax havens, and whether any operational 
changes occurred in the group)230. 
 
4.2.2. CFC reporting requirements 
A company that holds at least 10% of the participation rights in a CFC is required to submit an 
IT10B schedule231 as a supporting document to SARS when filing an income tax return232. 
 
228 Mazars.co.za, 2019 
229 Earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation – This approximates operational 
cash generated by an entity. 
230 Mazars.co.za, 2019 
231 SARS.gov.za, 2019b – See the example of the IT10B schedule in Appendix III that is required to 
be submitted with a taxpayer’s return providing information for an entity declared as a CFC. 
232 PKF.co.za, 2018 
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This schedule is in addition to the compliance questions that a taxpayer is required to complete 
on the return in relation to its CFC holding. The IT10B schedule requires the disclosure of a 
CFC’s contact details (its name, address, and country of incorporation and effective 
management), its foreign tax number, details of its operations and number of employees, its 
reported net profit, and financial year-end. A taxpayer is also required to stipulate the net 
income imputed into its return (indicating what portion of this income is attributable to an FBE) 
and to also note the foreign tax credit applied (if any) in terms of Section 6quat. Where no net 
income has been imputed, the taxpayer is required to state that one of the exemptions applied 
(i.e., that a taxpayer holds less than 10% of the CFC’s participation or voting rights, the CFC 
operates as an FBE or the CFC’s foreign taxes amount to at least 75%233 of the taxes that 
would’ve been payable had the CFC been a South African tax resident). If income was earned 
from transactions with related parties as stipulated in Section 9D(9A)(a), this information must 
be disclosed. Even if net income is deemed to be a nil amount, the IT10B schedule, along with 
most of its required fields, still needs to be completed and submitted. 
 
The submission of CFC information to SARS has been criticised for bringing little benefit to 
the fiscus when compared to the cost and time consumption experienced by taxpayers in 
making these submissions234. In most cases for taxpayers holding in excess of a 10% 
shareholding in a CFC that qualifies for the CFC income exemption(s), they would either need 
to prove the FBE exemption requirements or perform a South African tax calculation using the 
CFC’s income and expenditure to determine whether the entity qualifies for the high-tax 
exemption235. Taxpayers are either required to keep records on hand to prove that the FBE 
requirement has been met should this be queried by SARS or they may find themselves 
spending long periods of time and incurring costs on resources to calculate a CFC’s imputed 
income, only to find that the income is exempt in terms of the high-tax rate exemption. The net 
income calculation has also re-introduced an additional layer of complexity through the 
inclusion of transactions between a CFC and connected residents in terms of Section 
9D(9A)(a) (i.e., the diversionary rules). It may seem inefficient for taxpayers to keep track of 
these individual transactions, over and above the other net income calculation 




233 67.5% per the 2019 Draft TLAB 
234 Deloitte.com, 2018a 
235 Ibid 
236 Such requirements also include keeping track of CFC income earned that was subject to 
withholding taxes, as well as the payment of intra-group dividends. 
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4.2.3. The global sharing of taxpayer information 
In addition to introducing transparent reporting requirements, a critical aspect of the new 
regulations involves the sharing of this information between cooperating countries. Not only is 
SARS able to obtain access to MNE-submitted tax documents from an array of global revenue 
authorities, additional third-party institution reporting tools, such as the US Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and Common Reporting Standards (CRS), are also at SARS’ 
disposal to help assess BEPS risks. The legislative and treaty amendments described in 
Section 4.2.1.1. above required to enact the global sharing of CbC report information from a 
South African perspective, are also in place to facilitate the sharing of FATCA and CRS 
data237. 
 
4.2.3.1. Third-party institutions submitting taxpayer information to revenue 
authorities: FATCA and CRS 
Amendments to the TAA allowing for the consolidation of taxpayer information isn’t limited to 
the relationship between the taxpayer and the revenue authorities, but also extends to third 
parties, such as financial institutions.  
 
FATCA, which was introduced in the US in 2010, requires foreign financial institutions to report 
information on American account holders (specified US persons or passive entities with 
controlling persons that are specified US persons) to the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
To effect compliance by South African financial institutions, South Africa and the US signed a 
model inter-governmental agreement in 2014238. In that same year, the OECD, together with 
the G20, developed the Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters. 
This guide encompasses CRS requirements which are similar to FATCA, as they also 
necessitate the reporting of foreigners’ account information by local financial institutions to 
local revenue authorities239. The enactment of compliance was achieved through the signing 
or updating of information-exchange agreements between South Africa and other countries. 
In addition, South Africa became one of 135 signatories to the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (effective from 2014240) which facilitates cross-border 
cooperation for exchanging taxpayer information and recovering foreign tax claims241. Through 
this agreement, South Africa can share and receive information with 135 other countries. 
 
237 Stiglingh, et al., 2019: Section 11.13:1 
238 SARS.gov.za, 2019a 
239 SARS.gov.za, 2019a 
240 OECD.org, 2019b:5 
241 OECD.org, 2019c 
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Where none of the above agreements are yet in place, SARS retains the information gathered 
to date until such agreements are signed and effective242.  
 
South African financial institutions are required to capture information on foreign account 
holders (such as name, identification number, jurisdiction of residence, tax identification 
numbers, account number, account balance and account type) and report this information to 
SARS, which will then automatically share the information with the account holders’ respective 
countries of residence once a year on 31 May, provided that an information-sharing agreement 
is in place. In the case of US citizens who are South African account holders, FATCA 
information is automatically shared with the US on this date. Similarly, foreign jurisdictions that 
have an information-sharing agreement with South Africa will disclose information to SARS 
about South African residents who are account holders at financial institutions in those 
countries. The information shared can be that of both natural and juristic persons243. More 
than 100 countries have committed from September 2018 to exchange CRS information under 
more than 3 200 bilateral agreements244. 
 
Through the application of CRS, SARS has unprecedented insight into taxpayers’ foreign 
accounts. Utilising the information received from foreign jurisdictions and cross-referencing 
this with the information disclosed by those taxpayers in their annual tax returns and/or 
received as part of their (mandatory) TP reporting, gives SARS greater transparency of the 
international affairs of taxpayers. Having an eagle-eye view of a taxpayer’s global affairs 
improves the likelihood of identifying profit-shifting risks and other tax-avoidance behaviours 
that may not have been recognised before245. 
 
4.2.4. The overlap of CFC and TP mechanisms to target profit shifting 
Both sections 31 and 9D(9A) target the same related-party transactions, and thus the same 
income. When it comes to cross-border transacting, Section 31’s TP rules are geared to catch 
“affected transactions” by not only limiting it to those transactions between an entity and its 
shareholder(s), but also those transactions between fellow group entities (even inter-CFC 
transactions), provided that these entities are connected persons. In comparison, CFC rules 
only consider diversionary transactions in terms of Section 9D(9A)(a) between a CFC and 
connected persons and subject these to imputation, provided that there is a CFC to begin with 
 
242 SARS.gov.za, 2019a 
243 Ibid 
244 KPMG.com, 2018 
245 Note that this is within the scope of identifying tax-avoidance behaviour and not tax-evasion 
schemes. 
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(i.e., a foreign entity of which more than 50% is held by residents). From an income 
perspective, CFC rules deem both income from an FBE (i.e., active income), and net income 
that’s effectively taxed in the CFC’s country at (a minimum of) 21%246, to be nil for imputation 
purposes. TP rules, on the other hand, scrutinise all categories of related-party income, 
regardless of the offshore entity’ definition as a CFC, the source of the entity’s income or the 
rate at which the income is taxed at. TP rules thus appear to be better positioned to capture a 
wider spectrum of income and related-party transactions than CFC rules. 
 
In addition to targeting the same related-party income, there also appears to be a TP and CFC 
reporting overlap. Considering the TP and CFC disclosure requirements laid out above, there 
are many similarities between the information reported in the IT10B schedule and the 
information submitted in a master file, a local file, and a CbC report. In effect, the master and 
local files provide the detail of the high-level information that’s disclosed in an IT10B schedule. 
In a master file, details of an MNE group’s structure, including the geographical locations of 
the various group entities, as well as information relating to the group’s supply chain and its 
top products/services, overlaps with the IT10B schedule’s requirement to understand an 
MNE’s place of incorporation or effective management and its business activities. In a local 
file, detailed information on related-party transactions is disclosed, while the IT10B schedule 
merely requires disclosure of whether income was derived from related-party transactions 
listed in Section 9D(9A)(a). Over and above these locally submitted reports, SARS receives 
taxpayers’ offshore financial information from other countries by way of frequent CRS 
reporting. Essentially, once the four reports (the CbC report, master file, local file and IT10B 
schedule) are filed by taxpayers, SARS would have gathered the same information from these 
four sets of reporting tools that happen to be required by two sets of anti-avoidance rules, 
which overlap to achieve the same purpose. Foreign CRS reporting adds to the ever-growing 
database of collected taxpayer information – this multitude of reporting provides SARS with 
an array of BEPS risk-assessment data at its disposal. The sheer quantity of data provided 
means that the revenue authority would be equipped with the information to leave very few 
BEPS stones unturned. 
 
4.3. REVOLUTIONARY AMENDMENTS TO THE ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE 
Action 13 helped transform the way in which MNEs report their inter-group TP to revenue 
authorities, which has greatly improved the monitoring and assessment of BEPS risks. This 
reporting ensures that MNEs make use of arm’s length pricing – if such a price can’t be 
justified, an MNE could face penalties for non-compliance. Reporting wasn’t the only aspect 
 
246 To be 18.9% per the 2019 Draft TLAB. 
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of TP that was revolutionised as part of the BEPS Actions: Actions 8, 9 and 10 broadened the 
scope of the OECD’s traditional arm’s length pricing requirements to better align TP 
transactional outcomes with the cause of their created value247. In order to bring this envisaged 
alignment into effect, a revision of the arm’s length principle was required. 
 
MNEs can earn significant profits in low-tax jurisdictions (despite little operational activity 
occurring in those locations) as a result of transfers of their valuable intangibles to those 
regions. In order to address concerns about the alignment of value with the underlying 
economic activity creating it, the OECD identified three BEPS Project Actions to ensure this – 
these related to intangibles (Action 8), risks and capital (Action 9) and other high-risk 
transactions (Action 10). In order to meet the objectives of Actions 8, 9 and 10, the OECD 
concluded that special measures beyond the arm’s length principle weren’t required, as a 
strengthening of the respective guidelines was sufficient. This guidance strengthening resulted 
in an amendment to the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations (The Guidelines), with the most fundamental changes being made to the 
guidance on risk and intangibles248. 
 
A key assertion of this revised approach is that value is created from both the control of an 
intangible’s risks249 and from its initial or continuous development, enhancement, 
maintenance, protection and exploitation (DEMPE). As such, persons involved in this “value 
chain” should receive compensation to reflect the value they created from risks assumed 
and/or DEMPE functions performed. Therefore, the mere contractual250 (instead of functional) 
assumption of ownership (instead of value creation) shouldn’t entitle the legal owner to the 
sole right of generating returns. Instead, the legal owner should provide arm’s length 
compensation to the provider(s) of DEMPE functions, as well as those persons assuming a 
significant portion of the intangible’s economic risks. Essentially, in an MNE structure, the 
entity responsible for making the decisions regarding an intangible’s ability to generate income 
should be the entity yielding the related rewards, rather than the entity located in a tax haven 
with minimal operational activity and that happens to be the legal owner251. 
 
 
247 Deloitte.com, 2017a 
248 KPMG.us, 2019 
249 KPMG.us, 2019 – “Control over risk involves the following two elements of risk management: (i) 
The capability to make decisions to take on, lay off, or decline a risk-bearing opportunity, together with 
the actual performance of that decision-making function; and (ii) the capability to make decisions on 
whether and how to respond to the risks associated with the opportunity, together with the actual 
performance of that decision-making function.” 
250 KPMG.us, 2019 – This includes the contractual rights (inter-group) funders may assign to 
themselves in the development of IP, with limited operational involvement. 
251 KPMG.us, 2019 
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Although the use of The Guidelines’ arm’s length principle in a South African TP context hasn’t 
been enacted in the ITA, Practice Note 7 (“PN7”), which is used by taxpayers as a guide to 
interpret and apply Section 31, makes specific reference to the fact that all arm’s length price 
interpretations are to be drawn directly from The Guidelines252. SARS notes in PN7 it draws 
on this interpretation because of The Guidelines’ acceptance as the arm’s length standard by 
many other countries, as well as its ability to promote tax equality and to counter harmful tax 
regimes253. South Africa’s adoption of The Guidelines through PN7 as the means to determine 
an arm’s length price implies that South Africa follows the recently amended Guidelines which 
include the abovementioned modifications to the arm’s length principle. 
 
The expansion of the arm’s length principle to consider the eligibility of an MNE entity deriving 
its income from an asset it may legally own, whilst not truly sharing in the risks and rewards of 
ownership nor having a say in the asset’s strategic use within the group, pierces the veil of 
legal ownership to evaluate a transaction by its substance instead of its form. The principle 
considers value to be created by those who created or continue to maintain the asset, those 
who are exposed to both the upside and downside of an asset’s returns and/or those who are 
responsible for the asset’s strategic deployment. Although this approach may appear to be 
revolutionary in prescribing what is considered to be a fair arm’s length transaction (and thus 
its price) for TP purposes, this concept is embodied within existing CFC rules. The South 
African CFC rules apply the same principle by viewing the modus operandi of a CFC as a 
mere extension of its shareholders’ will by disregarding the legal separation between the CFC 
and its shareholders. Where shareholders attempt to shift their valuable assets to offshore 
locations with the intention of deferring or avoiding local tax, their actions are remedied by the 
CFC rules, such that they (as the derivers of value) ultimately bear the tax they were trying to 
avoid. The expansion of the scope of the arm’s length concept to align value creation with TP 
outcomes thus directly overlaps with the CFC principle of identifying the true creator of the 
entity’s value and amending the tax consequences to directly align these with the value-
creation reality. 
 
4.3.1. Broadening of the arm’s length scope 
The amendments to the arm’s length principle significantly broaden the scope beyond 
traditional transaction considerations. Instead of only looking at transactions, operations, 
schemes, agreements or understandings (as depicted in Section 31) to determine whether a 
 
252 OECD.org, 2018 
253 SARS, 1999:6 
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third-party price point was used, the new approach considers the roles of transaction parties 
by way of their risks assumed and rewards garnered.  
 
This new approach starts to encroach on traditional CFC territory. For example, consider a 
South African shareholder (“A”) and its CFC subsidiary (“B”) located in a jurisdiction that has 
a corporate tax rate lower than South Africa’s. Imagine A develops valuable IP in South Africa, 
which it then sells to B (at a fair market price). B, as the legal owner of the IP, then provides 
third-party customers with a right to use the IP for a market-related consideration. B has an 
operational agreement with A, whereby A continues to develop and maintain the IP. The 
agreement can be justified as being at arm’s length, but it’s structured in such a way that A’s 
income received from B closely approximates its expenditure, resulting in minimal profits being 
earned by A. In addition, B takes instruction from A with regards to the strategic use and 
deployment of the IP. From a CFC perspective, B is considered to act as an FBE, thus resulting 
in a nil inclusion of the CFC’s income in A’s tax return. From a TP perspective, however, the 
old rules would consider whether the agreement between A and B was merely at arm’s length 
(i.e., whether the price charged by A for its work performed as per the scope of the agreement 
was a justifiable market-related price). Under the new arm’s length principle consideration is 
given to the DEMPE performed by A, as well as the risks and control it assumes over B’s IP – 
these elements (which wouldn’t have been included in the existing operational agreement) 
would be factored in to increase the transaction price between A and B. This adjustment helps 
to restore compensation to the jurisdiction in which value is truly created. 
 
In addition to its broadened scope, the values within the revised arm’s length principle appear 
to be embedded within Action 3’s building blocks – most notably those that deal with the 
determination and allocation of income of a CFC (as outlined in Section 2.3.2). The way in 
which the CFC rules aim to identify instances of artificial profit shifting by adopting a risk-based 
approach appears to have a similar objective to the new arm’s length principle. For instance, 
in the categorical analysis of income, the building blocks consider the legal classification of 
income and the treatment of related-party transactions – this aspect is a key component of the 
new arm’s length principle. Furthermore, in the substance analysis of income, the source and 
substance analysis consider the activities of the CFC and thus the ability of the entity to earn 
its income on its own – these elements are also considered part of the new arm’s length 
principle. Even the excess profits analysis proposed in the building blocks adopts a similar 
realignment purpose. The building blocks’ considerations thus effectively reassign value to the 
underlying activities that created it – a principle that directly overlaps with the revised arm’s 
length provisions.  
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4.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
When considering the efficiency and effectiveness of targeting profit-shifting transactions, it is 
important to bear in mind that the MNEs with the largest profits are the culprits in shifting the 
most profits254. Given the tendency for avoidance behaviour to be concentrated amongst a 
few MNEs (10% of foreign-owned MNEs) that are responsible for nearly all (98% of) profit 
shifting into tax havens255, it follows that anti-shifting policies should be targeted at this group 
to yield the most effective anti-avoidance results256.  
 
The enhanced TP compliance requirements are a key part of solving the profit-shifting puzzle, 
as the detailed information provided by MNE groups by way of master files, local files and CbC 
reports can be used by SARS to paint a holistic picture of an MNE group’s operations. By 
disclosing similar information but on a high-level basis, the information provided in the IT10B 
schedule for the purpose of CFC reporting overlaps with the TP reporting requirements. In 
addition to these South African reporting requirements, the surplus layer of CRS information 
received about South African taxpayers’ offshore activities also helps to add colour to the 
MNE’s structural picture. By having access to this data, SARS is in a better position to 
determine whether South Africa is receiving its fair share of tax on these group profits.  
 
Furthermore, the revolution of the TP arm’s length principle, which ensures that entities within 
an MNE group are appropriately compensated for the value-adding functions they perform, 
has drastic implications for MNEs that shift their high-value intangibles to low-tax jurisdictions. 
The result of these amendments will see these profit-shifting entities ultimately bear the tax 
they were initially trying to avoid. 
 
In light of the above, there is a clear overlap between TP and CFC rules – not just in their 
purpose, but also in their reporting requirements, as well as in the way the TP arm’s length 
principle aligns TP outcomes with value creation. Considering that the bulk of profit shifting in 
South Africa has been performed by a small number of MNEs, the anti-avoidance method with 
the widest scope to address such inter-group transactions will be the most effective prevention 
mechanism. South Africa should earnestly consider the appropriateness of the existing CFC 
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CHAPTER 5: AN OVERVIEW OF CFC AND OTHER ANTI-AVOIDANCE 
REGULATIONS IN INDIA AND BRAZIL 
 
5.1. ELECTION OF BRICS COUNTRIES FOR COMPARISON 
The term “BRIC” was first used in 2001 by Goldman Sachs’ then Chairman of Asset 
Management, when he noted that Brazil, Russia, India and China’s (“BRIC”) forecasted growth 
was likely to exceed the forecasted growth of seven of the largest developed economies in 
the coming years. The term was extended to BRICS to include South Africa in 2010. Although 
the BRICS economies have not necessarily formed a political alliance nor a formal trading 
association, they have the potential to form a powerful economic bloc. By 2050, China and 
India are predicted to become the world’s dominant suppliers of services and manufactured 
goods, while Brazil and Russia are predicted to become just as dominant in the supply of raw 
materials. This growth trend shows that, in the future, the largest global economic powers will 
no longer be the richest on an income-per-capita basis257. The South African economy tends 
to be the outlier compared to the other BRICS economies, with its gross domestic product 
(GDP) being 4.6, 5.8, 7.7 and 38.0 times smaller than the GDPs of Russia, Brazil, India and 
China respectively. South Africa does, however, have a role to play among these emerging 
market leaders considering its status as one of the largest economies in Africa258.  
 
The research question aims to determine whether South Africa’s CFC rules appropriately 
achieve their purpose. To assess whether other developing countries have similar 
deliberations regarding their legislation, the Indian and Brazilian CFC (or CFC-equivalent) 
rules have been considered. India and Brazil have been chosen instead of other African 
economies because of their active involvement in the BEPS project259260. In addition, since 
South Africa’s CFC legislation is considered to be one of the most advanced among the G20, 
it would be better to assess other G20 nations’ approaches to the legislation, of which the 
BRICS countries’ interpretation would be most relevant considering the bloc’s stance on acting 
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5.2. THE (LACK OF) CFC RULES IN INDIA 
India committed to the BEPS outcome through its involvement in the BEPS project. It has 
been actively implementing the BEPS actions by amending provisions in its domestic 
legislation, as well as its DTAs262. Despite this commitment, India has not yet implemented 
any CFC legislation in its domestic law263, even though such rules were introduced for 
implementation in the Indian Direct Tax Code (IDTC) in 2010264. 
 
5.2.1. Non-implementation of CFC legislation in India 
The IDTC was drafted by the Indian government to help simplify the existing Indian Income 
Tax Act of 1961 (IITA). The idea was for this new bill to replace the IITA altogether. An initial 
draft was compiled in 2009, and was further amended in 2010 and 2012, with a final revised 
version released in 2014265. These efforts were put on hold until 2017, when the Indian 
government instructed a newly formed committee to draft a revised IDTC that would reform 
India’s income-tax laws to bring them in line with international best practice, whilst addressing 
the country’s economic needs. The committee report was finalised in August 2019. Whilst it is 
yet to be made public, a few high-level proposals were made available for public comment266. 
Despite the Indian government’s efforts, critics point out that the replacement of the IITA with 
the IDTC is unlikely, given that the enactment of a new tax law could jeopardise precedence 
set by case law, and make life for both tax officials and taxpayers unduly burdensome and 
administratively intensive during the change-over process. It has been suggested that the 
existing IITA should rather be amended for changes proposed in the IDTC267 – something 
which has already been taking place in recent years. 
 
Many important proposals that were initially introduced in each iteration of the IDTC have been 
subsequently enacted in the IITA. These include general anti-avoidance rules, the PoEM 
concept, taxation of the indirect transfer of assets, and advanced pricing provisions268. CFC 
rules, however, are yet to be enacted in the IITA despite appearing in the IDTC, and being 
recommended for implementation, since 2010269.  
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Critics argue that the CFC framework isn’t suited to India’s economic station, as India, unlike 
other developed countries that have enacted these rules, is a developing country and a net 
capital importer, while the rules are designed for countries that are net capital exporters270. 
Concerns based on the rules presented in the various iterations of the IDTC271 have also been 
raised, namely the risks of double taxation (as the draft rules have the power to override 
existing Indian DTAs272) and the adverse impact the rules could have on the competitiveness 
of Indian-controlled offshore entities. The draft rules’ active-income requirement, whereby 
entities are deemed to be CFCs if 50% of their income is from passive rather than active 
sources, has been condemned for being anti-competitive by not accommodating newly 
established foreign entities that may fail to generate significant active income in their first 
year(s) of operation273. Critics have also highlighted that Indian MNEs making use of offshore 
treasury companies to finance their offshore merger and acquisition activities could be placed 
at a competitive disadvantage if such treasury companies were to be subjected to additional 
CFC taxation274. Administrative burdens and associated costs have also been highlighted as 
issues to consider275. 
 
5.2.2. Indian PoEM rules 
Although CFC legislation hasn’t been enacted in India, other similar anti-avoidance 
mechanisms have been incorporated into the IITA. The Indian government has adopted an 
expanded version of the concept of PoEM to determine the residency of a foreign company. 
This ensures that entities incorporated in foreign jurisdictions that are effectively controlled by 
Indian residents do not escape Indian taxation. Although these regulations are not seen as an 
anti-abuse tool per se, India’s PoEM rules are viewed as the closest piece of legislation that 
the country has to a CFC regime. Despite this, PoEM criteria are criticised for being subjective 
and the view is that the implementation of CFC legislation may assist in clarifying the law’s 
ambiguities, by specifically targeting passive income276. 
 
Section 6(3) of the IITA (the section of the act harbouring the PoEM provisions) was amended 
in 2015 before becoming effective on 1 April 2017. The reason for implementing this change 
was to prevent taxpayers from engaging in avoidance behaviour by manipulating the old PoEM 
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rules to avoid being taxed as an Indian resident277. In terms of the recently amended 
legislation, a foreign company conducting active business outside India may be deemed to be 
an Indian tax resident, and thus subject to Indian taxation on its worldwide income, if it is found 
that its PoEM has been established in India. PoEM is defined as the place where key 
management operates and where commercial decisions are made to facilitate the conduct of 
an offshore company’s operations, and no regard is given to the foreign entity’s location (nor 
the reason for its (elected) jurisdiction)278. The rules also consider the foreign company to have 
its PoEM in India if more than half of the number of persons employed, and the related salary 
bill incurred by the entity, relates to Indian personnel279. As one would expect, these rules have 
been criticised for threatening foreign investment with such broad residency rules, as large 
MNEs may think twice before deploying capital for international projects through India280. 
 
PoEM has been highlighted as comparative to CFC regulations, however these two sets of 
rules have unconnected focus areas. PoEM assesses control by considering the impact an 
entity’s resident board members and key local management have on the foreign firm’s 
decision-making processes281, while the CFC rules look through to the control exerted by a 
foreign entity’s resident shareholders. The CFC regulations target the shifting of profits into 
low tax jurisdictions, and the corresponding deferral of a resident’s tax liability, while the PoEM 
rules subject all applicable offshore income earned to Indian taxation, i.e., income earned by 
both active businesses (an active business earns less than half of its total income from passive 
sources and related-party transactions)282 and non-active businesses283. It is evident from the 
above that PoEM’s stance on anti-avoidance drastically differs from the CFC outlook. Thus it 
is irrelevant to draw further comparisons between these two rules given their misaligned 
purposes.  
 
Although India doesn’t have CFC legislation in place at present, it has focussed on 
implementing other aspects of the BEPS Action Plan into its legislation to counter profit 
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5.2.3. Other anti-avoidance provisions adopted in India: TP regulations 
India has acknowledged that BEPS continues to remain a concern for its economy, with most 
profit shifting taking place as a result of aggressive TP policies adopted by MNEs284. The 
Indian revenue authorities have indicated that excessive related-party payments (such as the 
payment of management fees, royalties and interest by local entities to foreign affiliates) have 
been a major contributor to the country’s BEPS challenges285. These avoidance methods have 
been further exacerbated by the lack of transparent reporting by MNEs to the Indian 
government286. To counter this, India has highlighted TP as a high-risk area287 and has, in 
response, enhanced its TP regulations and overhauled its tax audit system over the last 
decade288. 
 
The Indian TP regime is perceived to be one of the most aggressive in the world289. With effect 
from the beginning of the 2016 tax year, India adopted the three-tier TP documentation system 
(master file, local file and CbC reporting) as outlined in BEPS Action 13290, such that its 
adoption of these recommendations has closely followed Action 13’s recommendations291. 
These reports help to provide MNE group and transactional information to the Indian revenue 
authorities, thereby improving transparency between MNEs and the Indian government292.  
 
There are, however, aspects of Indian legislation that don’t strictly adopt the proposed BEPS 
standards, as the need to accommodate local circumstances has seen the Indian government 
alter elements of these recommendations293. Although Indian TP regulations (ITPR) broadly 
follow the OECD’s five-method standard294 (encompassed in Actions 8, 9, 10 and 13) to 
determine the arm’s length price in related-party transactions295, a so-called sixth method has 
also been adopted. This method takes any other method into account by considering the price 
that was or would have been charged or paid for the same or similar uncontrolled transaction 
under similar circumstances296. The assumption that the data required to perform price 
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comparisons in any one of the OECD’s five methods readily exists (as one may expect in 
developed nations) has been widely criticised for not necessarily being applicable to 
developing countries297. To accommodate such a scenario, India’s inclusion of this additional 
method allows taxpayers the flexibility to use other data sources to justify the use of an elected 
price (for example, by using tender documents, third-party quotations, valuation reports, and 
negotiation documents), although taxpayers must still justify why the other methods were not 
considered appropriate298.  Adopting the sixth method thus demonstrates how India has taken 
BEPS recommendations and tailored them to suit its developing nation status. 
 
The enhanced ITPR showcases India’s commitment to combatting avoidance behaviour by 
mitigating its biggest BEPS risk – the shifting of profits by MNEs operating in India299. For now, 
India’s management of this risk doesn’t include the enactment of CFC legislation (despite 
recommendations for its implementation existing since 2010). Many critics argue that it should 
not be a priority to justify the enactment of the legislation given India’s net capital importing 
status, as well as the fact that there is little data showing that residents are deferring profits 
offshore300. This may be as a result of India prioritising other avoidance risks, combined with 
the government’s response to CFC criticism as it attempts to balance its support for business 
growth whilst combating BEPS301. Despite PoEM being noted as potentially comparable to 
CFC rules, it doesn’t target profit shifting and tax deferral in the same manner. Thus, for now, 
India doesn’t appear to have any regulations in place to solely target such Action 3 BEPS 
risks. 
 
5.3. THE CFC RULES IN BRAZIL 
Brazil’s CFC regulations were enacted in 2001, followed by a reform in 2014 which became 
law on 1 January 2015. Although Brazil was actively involved in the creation of the BEPS 
Action Plan302, Brazil’s CFC rules, like India’s PoEM rules, have been criticised for being used 
as a tax collection tool rather than an anti-avoidance measure, as well as for inadequately 
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5.3.1. An overview of Brazil’s CFC legislation 
Brazil’s current CFC legislation (which was amended in 2014304) subjects the profits of directly 
and indirectly controlled entities located offshore to Brazilian taxation, in which such profits 
are calculated according to the applicable accounting rules of the CFC’s jurisdiction305. In 
attributing this income, the rules incorporate the usual CFC elements of establishing the 
definition of a CFC with reference to residents’306 control, as well as the use of foreign tax 
credits to reduce the Brazilian tax imposed on such imputed income. The rules, however, 
deviate from international (Action 3) standards in certain instances, by applying the full-income 
inclusion method without distinguishing between the active and passive nature of such 
income, and by not incorporating any imputed-income exemptions.  
 
In determining whether a foreign entity is subject to the Brazilian CFC rules, one would 
consider not only a shareholder’s voting rights, but also their power over the entity’s decision-
making processes and the resultant impact on electing the majority of persons to the 
company’s governing authority (such as the board of directors)307. Both foreign-controlled 
companies (FCCs) – entities that control the abovementioned decision-making processes – 
and foreign affiliates (FAs) – entities that influence the abovementioned decision-making 
processes – can have their income imputed for CFC purposes. A foreign entity is presumed 
to be controlled if a shareholder or related-party shareholders hold more than 50% of the 
foreign entity’s voting rights. Foreign entities whose Brazilian shareholders hold in excess of 
20% of such voting rights are considered to be affiliated entities308.  
 
All profits of FCCs accrue to Brazilian shareholders in proportion to their shareholdings for tax-
calculation purposes, although they exclude profits attributable to other FCCs that are directly 
or indirectly controlled by the same shareholders (inter-group profits are effectively eliminated 
to avoid double counting and thus double taxation). However, in the instance where FCCs 
derive their income from services directly related to the pre-operational phases of Brazilian oil 
and gas industries (i.e., prospecting and exploration), such profits are not imputed. For FAs, 
profits will only be included in a shareholder’s tax calculation when they’re declared as a 
dividend, provided that the FA isn’t located in a low-tax jurisdiction (such as a tax haven and/or 
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a sub-taxation regime309)310. Should the FA not meet these criteria, its income will accrue to 
the shareholder as if it were an FCC311.  
 
The all-inclusive nature of these rules counter Action 3’s anti-avoidance purpose by ignoring 
an FCC/FA’s jurisdiction of incorporation and level of tax paid in the foreign jurisdiction and by 
disregarding the nature of the income earned by these entities, such that both active and 
passive incomes are imputed312. A further illustration of how these rules deviate from the 
Action 3 recommendations is that they don’t incorporate exemptions for a taxpayer’s imputed 
income (apart from the abovementioned oil industry exemption)313. This so-called anti-
avoidance measure thus results in the imputation of all offshore income regardless of whether 
there was an intention to avoid or defer tax, and/or tax savings were realised.  
 
Concerns have also been raised regarding the conflict between the CFC full-income inclusion 
method and Article 7 of Brazil’s DTAs. In the 2014 case National Treasury v. Companhia Vale 
do Rio Doce (the Vale case), the compatibility of Brazil’s pre-2014 CFC legislation with Article 
7 in Brazil’s treaties with Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark was challenged in the Brazilian 
courts, after the Brazilian revenue authorities sought to tax profits earned by taxpayers’ CFCs 
located in those jurisdictions. The court found that Article 7, which doesn’t allow a contracting 
state to tax the business profits earned by a resident of another contracting state (unless a 
fixed place of business exists in that first contracting state), protects the profits of an entity not 
located in such a contracting state – as such, Brazil’s CFC rules could not apply to the profits 
earned in those jurisdictions314.  
 
In another (earlier) case, Eagle Distribuidora de Bebidas S/A v. National Treasury (the Eagle 
case), the taxpayer contested the revenue authority’s inclusion of profits from a Spanish 
subsidiary (in terms of the pre-2014 CFC rules) using the same rationale as the Vale case 
(i.e., that Article 7 of the Brazilian-Spanish DTA applied instead of Brazil’s CFC rules). The 
outcome of this ruling differed from the Vale case – the court held that the disputed income 
from the Spanish subsidiary (which was equity-accounted income from that entity’s 
Argentinian and Uruguayan subsidiaries) arose as a result of the Spanish entity’s passive 
earnings, thus the income wasn’t “business profits” within the scope of Article 7. The revenue 
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authority’s inclusion of this income under the then-CFC provisions was found to be valid by 
the court. Despite this ruling, the court’s views have been criticised for its erroneous 
interpretation of international tax law and treaty provisions315. 
  
The rulings that applied to the Vale and Eagle cases highlight the interpretative conflict that 
exists with regards to the interaction of CFC rules with DTA provisions. Although these rulings 
only apply to the pre-2014 CFC regime, it remains to be seen whether these interpretations 
will continue to have jurisprudence as disputes between taxpayers and the revenue authority 
arise over the interpretation and application of the new CFC regulations. 
 
Despite the onerous income-inclusion requirements, the Brazilian revenue authorities have 
offered some relief to taxpayers. Where offshore income has been deemed to accrue to a 
Brazilian shareholder, the Brazilian revenue authorities provided taxpayers with the option to 
defer their imposed tax obligation, such that 12.5% of the offshore imputed income would be 
deemed to be distributed (and thus subject to tax) in the first year, with the balance deemed 
to be distributed up to, and including, the eighth subsequent year (during which time the tax 
obligation falls due)316. Such a deferral isn’t interest-free, however – in deferring these taxes, 
the outstanding tax obligation will attract interest at LIBOR317 until all taxes have been paid318. 
In addition to this payment deferral, authorities granted Brazilian shareholders the ability to 
consolidate profits/losses from all FCCs until 2022, provided that the FCC’s country has an 
exchange of information agreement with Brazil, at least 80% of the entity’s income is active in 
nature and the FCC isn’t located in a tax haven or sub-taxation regime. The consolidation of 
these jurisdictions’ income would allow loss-making FCCs to be offset against profitable ones, 
thereby reducing the calculated Brazilian tax319. 
 
One of the Action 3 recommendations that Brazil has complied with allows the offset of foreign 
tax credits against the local tax imposed from the inclusion of an FCC/FA’s profits. For FCCs, 
a Brazilian shareholder may deduct the foreign corporate taxes paid, as well as dividends 
withholding taxes paid, from the Brazilian taxes due (in proportion to the shareholder’s 
participation in such an FCC, but limited to the Brazilian tax imposed on the inclusion). For 
FAs, only the dividends withholding taxes paid can be credited against the tax raised on the 
FA’s imputed income. It should be noted that these foreign tax credits will only be granted in 
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the year in which such foreign tax is imposed and paid320. The rules also incorporate a 9% 
presumed tax credit (available until 2022) for Brazilian shareholders whose FCCs are involved 
in the construction industry or the production of food or beverage products321.  
 
5.3.2. Brazil versus BEPS 
The Brazilian CFC rules don’t appear to have incorporated the BEPS Action 3 building blocks 
(as outlined in Section 2.3.) into the domestic legislation – the rules don’t factor in exemptions 
for the generation of active income (building block 2) nor have any computation and attribution 
rules (building blocks 4 and 5) been considered. Disregarding whether passive or active 
income has been earned by an FCC or FA by adopting a full-income inclusion method is also 
not in line with the CFC purpose of tackling the deferral of taxation on offshore passive income. 
For these reasons, critics argue that the Brazilian government has ignored the long-term 
impact these rules could have on the competitiveness of Brazilian MNEs and economic 
growth, by instead favouring a short-term policy that may over-tax residents and boost tax 
revenues322. 
 
The Brazilian revenue authorities have also been criticised for failing to appropriately reform 
the legislation as an effective anti-avoidance mechanism by only incorporating beneficial 
provisions for certain categories of taxpayers that exert political influence. Examples of this 
influence can be seen in the addition of the 9% tax credit for taxpayers operating in the 
construction, food and beverage industries, as well as the outright exclusion of the application 
of the rules to individuals323. 
 
Although Brazil’s CFC rules have faced much criticism, it doesn’t appear that the 
implementation of Action 3 recommendations into the domestic legislation will be prioritised at 
this stage. Like their Indian counterparts, the Brazilian authorities have highlighted that TP 
remains one of the key BEPS risks as the use of inter-group cross-border transactions has 
been identified as one of the most common BEPS techniques exploited by MNEs. As such, 
Brazil has identified Actions 8, 9, 10 and 13 (as well as 4 and 12324) as the most important 
Actions from the BEPS Action Plan that it will be focusing on to counter BEPS325.  
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As the purpose of Brazil’s current CFC legislation doesn’t necessarily prevent profit shifting or 
deferral to low-tax jurisdictions, alternative aspects of Brazil’s legislation (namely its TP rules) 
are considered for comparative purposes.  
 
5.3.3. Other anti-avoidance provisions adopted in Brazil: TP regulations 
As one of Brazil’s key concerns has been the lack of exchange of information disclosure to 
determine taxpayer compliance326, the country has prioritised the enactment of this aspect of 
Action 13 in its legislation. Brazil’s required disclosure (effective from 2016) is similar to Action 
13’s CbC report, in which taxpayers are required to disclose profits earned by foreign-
controlled subsidiaries on a per-country basis, and to provide the details of import and export 
transactions. Brazil’s report, however, isn’t considered to be as detailed as the CbC reporting 
requirements outlined in Action 13. In addition, not all elements of the Action recommendations 
have been adopted by Brazil – Action 13 recommends incorporating the three-tier 
documentation system, but Brazil is yet to incorporate these requirements into its legislation327. 
 
Brazil’s TP rules may struggle to adapt to the detailed three-tier Action 13 recommendations 
considering that the current legislation doesn’t require detailed submissions from taxpayers in 
the form of master and local files. This is largely as a result of the simplified arm’s length 
pricing techniques that have been adopted in Brazil. Brazil’s TP rules seek to adopt elements 
of the OECD’s arm’s-length principle by only permitting three transaction methods out of the 
five-method standard to determine an arm’s length price, namely the comparable uncontrolled 
price (CUP), the cost plus (CPM) and the resale price (RSP) methods. In addition, the sixth 
method has been adopted for import and export transactions involving commodities which 
require the use of the CUP method, such that quotations instead of comparative transactions 
may be used to determine an arm’s length price. An additional simplification method is the 
fixing of mark-ups and margins according to a taxpayer’s industry for the CPM and RSP 
methods respectively328. It should be noted, however, that transactions involving royalty 
payments, administration and scientific fees, technical assistance, etc. are not subject to 
Brazil’s TP regulations.  
 
The creation of pricing certainty and the simplification of calculations by using other available 
information instead of having to select comparable transactions, the setting of predetermined 
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margins across various industries, and omitting the complications of setting an arm’s length 
price involving the use of intangibles, reduces compliance costs which benefits both taxpayers 
and the revenue authorities. Taxpayers are merely required to submit their methods used, 
together with the applicable method’s calculations, in their annual tax returns which the 
revenue authorities then monitor accordingly329. These simplified rules have also helped to 
reduce litigation between taxpayers and the state, as the uncertainty that comes with adopting 
a price based on a comparable transaction is eliminated330. Although this simplification has 
helped to reduce the costs and complexities of TP compliance, the rules have been criticised 
for exposing taxpayers to double-taxation risks and for hampering Brazil’s integration into 
global value chains, largely because of the conflict between international TP regulations 
adopted by MNEs and Brazil’s dissimilar TP legislation that these MNEs are required to adhere 
to331. 
 
In light of this criticism, Brazil’s recent announcement of its intention to join the OECD 
launched a 15-month long project to explore how Brazil’s TP laws could be aligned with the 
OECD’s Guidelines. In July 2019, the outcomes of the project were announced: 30 Brazilian 
rules with key differences were identified, of which 27 increased the risk of double taxation332. 
The OECD concluded that these discrepancies have an adverse effect on MNEs’ ability to do 
business, as well as on tax collections earned, finding that Brazil’s acceptance into the 
organisation would be dependent on the country’s full alignment with the OECD’s TP 
guidelines333. The Brazilian revenue authorities have acknowledged that the current rules 
create additional complexities despite their simple and practical application and have 
resultantly expressed their desire to align Brazilian TP legislation with the Guidelines, pending 
governmental evaluation334. 
 
Brazil’s tax legislation is known for being incompatible with the OECD principles, as the 
country has a history of incorporating only aspects of recommended international standards 
into its domestic legislation that suit its domestic purposes335. Although there is some merit in 
Brazil’s deviation, in that the simplicity of Brazilian anti-avoidance rules reduce costs 
associated with administration and enforceability, commentators still criticise this legislation 
for focussing on revenue collection objectives instead of protecting the local tax base336. 
 
329 Gomes de Oliveira & Lisboa Moreira, 2017 
330 Valadão, 2016 
331 Tomazela, 2019 
332 Amano, 2019 
333 Tomazela, 2019 
334 Amano, 2019 
335 KPMG.com, 2017:12 
336 Bianco & Santos, 2017 
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Brazil’s recent commitment to amending its TP regulations showcases the revenue authorities’ 
desire to transform its international tax legislation, not just to allow Brazil to join the OECD, 
but to also enact the desired TP changes needed to combat MNE BEPS behaviour. It remains 
to be seen whether Brazil will enact legislation that effectively deters BEPS.337 
 
5.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Both India and Brazil have identified the damaging impact MNEs can have on their economies 
when they apply profit-shifting techniques. To combat these BEPS behaviours, both countries 
appear to be prioritising the strengthening of their TP legislation rather than their CFC (or CFC-
equivalent) rules.  
 
Despite India’s commitment to the enactment of the BEPS Action Plan, as well as its continued 
support for the enactment of CFC legislation (as noted in the comments to the IDTC), these 
rules have not yet found their way into India’s legislation. This may be as a result of Action 3 
not forming part of the priority BEPS actions for India’s implementation plan338, although it is 
possible that public criticism against the implementation of CFC legislation may also be 
delaying its enactment. This approach is not surprising given India’s comments that the 
implementation of the BEPS actions should be done with caution by developing countries, as 
the rules are largely skewed to developed nations with different economic needs to their 
developing counterparts339. India’s adoption of a sixth method in addition to the OECD’s five-
method approach for determining an arm’s length price for TP assessment purposes340 is an 
example of the country’s consideration and adaptation of OECD recommendations to its 
economic station. 
 
Brazil is another example of a BRICS country that hasn’t incorporated all of the OECD 
recommendations into its domestic legislation. The criticism against Brazil’s piecemeal 
adoption of the BEPS actions doesn’t seem to have inspired reforms of the country’s CFC 
regulations, even while these rules are condemned for being used as a tax collection tool 
instead of as an anti-avoidance measure. One of the few benefits of Brazil’s CFC legislation, 
however, is that the administrative burden on Brazilian authorities and taxpayers is relatively 
low, as the attribution rules are simple to comply with (for instance, a CFC’s accounting profits 
are easily imputed without the need to separately calculate passive and active income341). The 
 
337 For a direct comparison between the Action 3 building blocks and the South African CFC 
legislation, see Appendix II. 
338 United Nations, 2014a:6 
339 United Nations, 2014a:8 
340 Action Aid, 2015 
341 Lessa, 2017:27-28 
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prioritisation of simplicity is also a theme in Brazil’s TP legislation, as utilising predetermined 
margin methodologies is suited to the country’s limited technical knowledge of TP issues342. 
Despite its inaction on CFCs, Brazil’s consideration in recent months of reform to its TP rules 
will help to align its tax laws with the BEPS project, even though the impetus for these changes 
may have been borne from Brazil’s desire to join the OECD. Such reforms will help Brazil to 
enact some of the BEPS Actions it considers to be most important (namely, Actions 8, 9, 10 
and 13) in countering BEPS manoeuvres committed by MNEs343. However, the 
implementation of the OECD’s recommendations will be dependent on the Brazilian 
government’s desire to make these changes. 
 
It is evident from the above that India and Brazil have directed their focus to strengthen their 
TP rather than CFC regulations to combat BEPS. India has criticised proposed CFC legislation 
for being anti-competitive as well as burdensome from a compliance perspective, while Brazil 
hasn’t yet prioritised the incorporation of key Action 3 requirements into its regime (which may 
complicate its over-simplified approach to taxpayer compliance and resultant monitoring by 
the revenue authority). Both countries appear to have side-lined CFC regulations in favour of 
TP, given that these rules are seen to be more effective in countering profit-shifting tactics 




342 Valadão, 2016 
343 United Nations, 2014b:2-3 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this dissertation was to conduct extensive research and analysis to answer 
the primary research question: 
“Can the purpose of curbing tax avoidance embedded within South Africa’s CFC rules be more 
simply achieved?” 
 
To answer this question, the following aspects were interrogated:  
i. Chapter 2 explored a brief history of the rules and examined the existing application 
of the rules within the ITA; 
ii. Chapter 3 considered the impact of complex international laws on South Africa’s 
domestic tax legislation and the result these effects have on the application of the 
country’s CFC rules. It also explored the outlook that developed nations, such as 
the UK and the US, have regarding the proposed strengthening of CFC legislation 
advocated in the BEPS Action Plan; 
iii. Chapter 4 assessed the reporting overlap and principle application of the TP and 
CFC rules; and 
iv. Chapter 5 reviewed the standpoint that fellow BRICS nations India and Brazil have 
taken up with regards to CFC and TP legislation. 
 
A brief summary of these respective chapter findings is laid out below, together with the final 
recommendations that were derived from the answering of the above question. 
 
6.2. CFC BACKGROUND SUMMARY 
The initial introduction of CFC rules in South Africa was an understandably defensive tactic, 
given the government’s need to protect its tax base and prevent capital shifting in the wake of 
the relaxation of exchange control regulations. The purpose of the legislation was to deter 
taxpayers, who had the intention of reducing or deferring their South African tax obligations, 
from shifting their profits offshore by using artificial structuring techniques. South Africa’s CFC 
regime has developed over the years to become one the strongest set of such rules amongst 
the G20 nations. 
 
CFC rules came under the spotlight on a global scale soon after the global financial crisis, as 
profit-shifting manoeuvres adopted by MNEs to take advantage of cross-border tax-rate 
arbitrage was exposed. G20 politicians responded to the resultant public outrage by appointing 
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the OECD to develop anti-avoidance guidelines, culminating in the BEPS Action Plan. Part of 
this plan included the strengthening of CFC rules as depicted in Action 3. South Africa’s CFC 
rules, harboured within Section 9D of the ITA, appear to be closely aligned with the Action 3 
recommendations. 
 
6.3. SOUTH AFRICA’S NEED TO REMAIN COMPETITIVE 
South Africa’s ITA is considered to be a body of “patchwork”344 that has been created largely 
from the transplanted pieces of international legislation slotted into domestic regulations. This 
methodology was applied in the development of Section 9D, as aspects of foreign CFC rules 
or accounting standards were assimilated into the section without due consideration of the 
impact these components could have on domestic interpretation. This created legal and 
effective complexities within South Africa’s CFC rules, despite the regime’s close alignment 
with the Action 3 recommendations. Notwithstanding its perceived sophistication in 
comparison to other G20 regimes, the legislation’s complexities could hinder the 
competitiveness of South African businesses operating abroad. Furthermore, the “patchwork” 
methodology creates a risk of misinterpretations occurring when these transplanted 
components are applied in a domestic (and international) context. These complexities could 
adversely impact the competitiveness of South African MNEs, as well as dampen South 
Africa’s appeal in attracting foreign investment. Considering South Africa’s reliance on 
corporate taxes for revenue collection purposes, it would be in the country’s interest to 
stimulate corporate growth that would in turn grow the tax base, and thus tax collections. 
 
6.4. NON-ADOPTION OF ACTION 3’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
Regardless of the strength and sophistication of South Africa’s CFC regime, its domestic 
enforcement may not necessarily have the desired impact in deterring cross-border tax-
avoidance behaviour. The OECD recommended that a global strengthening of CFC rules 
would create an ideal outcome in deterring this behaviour. However, it didn’t anticipate the 
impact that a series of “prisoner’s dilemma” choices made by various countries would have on 
the implementation of Action 3’s recommendations. Two of the world’s largest developed 
countries, the US and the UK, appear to have snubbed these recommendations by adopting 
tax policies to suit the growth strategies of their MNEs – a move which risks starting a race to 
the corporate-tax bottom. This trend of non-adoption (not only in the US and the UK, but in 
fellow BRICS nations Brazil and India as well) may inhibit the effectiveness of South Africa’s 
CFC rules in achieving its purpose of deterring tax avoidance. 
 
344 Li & Pidduck, 2019 
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6.5. THE INDIAN AND BRAZILIAN OUTLOOK 
Despite the initial drafting of CFC rules in India by 2010, the regime is yet to be enacted into 
India’s IITA. These draft rules have been criticised for being ill-suited to India’s economic 
standing given its status as a developing country, as well as the fact that the legislation is 
primarily designed to meet the needs of net capital exporters rather than net capital importers. 
India’s focus has instead been on enhancing its TP rules to counter MNE tax avoidance, to 
the extent that the country’s TP rules have been developed to become one of the most 
aggressive regimes in the world. Although India incorporated the BEPS standards into its TP 
legislation, it has acknowledged that not all aspects of these recommendations are necessarily 
suited to its economic needs. As such, India has taken the liberty of tailoring certain elements 
of these standards (such as the adoption of a sixth method to determine an arm’s length price) 
to better suit its developing nation status. 
 
Brazil is another example of a developing country that incorporated selected components of 
international tax principles into its legislation that best suit its domestic purposes. Brazil’s CFC 
regime fails to tackle the deferral of taxation on offshore passive income by overlooking a key 
anti-avoidance aspect – whether there was an intention to avoid tax. As such, the rules have 
been criticised for being used as a tax collection tool when their purpose is instead to act as a 
tax-avoidance deterrent. Despite this, no plans appear to be on the horizon to reform these 
rules to align with the Action 3 recommendations. Brazil has instead focussed its attention on 
amending its TP legislation, not only for the purpose of countering the BEPS risks that have 
been identified through MNEs’ cross-border TP manipulation, but also for the purpose of 
aligning its tax principles with those of the OECD’s as a result of its desire to join the 
organisation. 
 
India and Brazil have therefore not placed reliance on CFC rules for the purpose of combating 
MNE profit shifting. They have instead matched their anti-avoidance approach (focussing on 
TP) to the elements identified as posing key BEPS risks – the manipulation of cross-border 
pricing by MNEs. 
 
6.6. THE TP AND CFC OVERLAP 
As MNE cross-border transactions have become more complex, taxpayer reporting has 
evolved to accommodate SARS’ need to effectively monitor BEPS and TP risks. The required 
submission of taxpayer operational and economic information incorporated in the CbC, master 
file and local file reports, has given SARS unprecedented access to MNE information on a 
global scale. Even if taxpayer submission isn’t required, MNEs would still perform this 
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reporting function given that SARS may request this information at any time. It was also found 
that the high-level information reported from a TP perspective happens to overlap with the 
information required for submission for CFC reporting purposes. In addition to these local 
reporting requirements, SARS also receives CRS information on South African taxpayers from 
third-party institutions from around the world. The access to such a broad range of taxpayer 
data gives SARS unprecedented insight into taxpayer affairs, allowing the revenue authority 
to cross-reference locally submitted information with foreign submissions received. Access to, 
and the interpretation of, this data will become a crucial means by which SARS monitors and 
assesses profit-shifting risks. 
 
In addition to reporting, an overlap in principle between TP and CFC rules was also 
established. The adoption of the arm’s length principle is an integral part of the ITA’s TP 
legislation, such that Section 31’s title makes deliberate reference to it – “Tax payable in 
respect of international transactions to be based on arm’s length principle”. To interpret what 
constitutes an arm’s length price or transaction in a South African context, common practice 
is to draw on the interpretations laid out in The Guidelines. The release of Actions 8, 9 and 10 
prompted the OECD to revise The Guidelines to amend the arm’s length principle to align TP 
outcomes with the underlying value creation. Since SARS and South African taxpayers use 
The Guidelines, it follows that these amendments have a direct impact on local arm’s length 
interpretations. Although this alignment of compensation and value was revolutionary from a 
TP perspective, these principles were already embodied within South Africa’s existing CFC 
legislation. Preventing the creation of value mismatches simulated by controlling shareholders 
with the ability to control the financial and economic actions of an MNE is a principle that both 
TP arm’s length interpretations and CFC rules now share. Furthermore, the TP rules apply to 
a broader scope of transactions as they’re not limited to only considering the value shift that 
may occur between a shareholder and their controlled offshore entity. 
 
6.7. RECOMMENDATION 
In answering the primary research question, there appears to be a simpler way to achieve the 
anti-avoidance purpose embodied within South Africa’s existing CFC legislation. Although the 
South African CFC regime has been identified as one of the most complex amongst the G20, 
deterring tax avoidance doesn’t necessarily require complexity, but rather efficiency. Bearing 
this in mind, MNEs have been identified as the main profit-shifting culprits in South Africa – it 
thus follows that attention must be given to the appropriate legislation that targets these 
entities, thereby enhancing the coverage of BEPS risks and yielding better anti-avoidance 
results. In order for CFC rules to achieve their best results in curbing global profit shifting, all 
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countries should be strengthening their regimes – if there is limited global adoption, the impact 
of strong domestic legislation on achieving this purpose may be somewhat diminished. From 
this dissertation’s assessment of four other countries’ (the UK, the US, India and Brazil’) 
approach to the OECD’s call for the global strengthening of CFC rules, actioning these 
amendments doesn’t appear to be a priority for these countries. Such global non-adoption 
could have an adverse impact on the success of South Africa’s CFC rules achieving their 
purpose, such that it could render them ineffective. South Africa’s existing TP legislation, 
however, whose reporting and (recently amended) arm’s length principles have been shown 
to directly overlap with the CFC regime, has been shown to better target the pricing 
manipulations committed by these MNEs.  
 
As the other side of the tax complexity coin is tax simplification (which can be achieved by 
simplifying the existing legal and effective complexities), it is recommended that, in order to 
more simply and effectively target profit shifting, sole reliance should be placed on South 
Africa’s TP legislation. Simplicity would be achieved by only having to rely on Section 31 of 
the ITA (and not Section 9D as well) and by also removing the CFC reporting requirements. 
As TP legislation effectively covers all aspects of the purpose which CFC rules aim to achieve, 
and considering that TP legislation eliminates the need for these rules’ existence, it is therefore 
recommended that South Africa’s CFC regime is repealed. It is further recommended that 
additional research is performed to assess the economic impact the removal of CFC legislation 
would have in a South African context. 
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APPENDIX I: COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SOUTH AFRICAN, US, UK AND BRAZILIAN CFC REGIMES 
 
 South Africa345 United Kingdom346 United States of America347 Brazil348 
BEPS Action 
3 building 
blocks 1 & 2: 
Control  
Definition: A CFC is defined as a 
foreign entity in which South African 
residents hold >50% participation 
rights in a foreign entity, or where a 
foreign entity is consolidated into a 
resident entity’s financial statements 
in terms of IFRS 10. 
Definition: A CFC is defined as a 
foreign entity in which UK 
shareholders control an entity 
operating in a low-tax jurisdiction. An 
entity is “controlled” when UK 
residents own >50% interest or 
when UK residents own >40% 
interest and a non-resident owns at 
least a 55% interest. 
Definition: A CFC is defined as a 
foreign entity in which US 
shareholders own >50% of an entity 
by vote or by value. 
Definition: A CFC is an FCC (>50% 
shareholding) or FA (>20% 
shareholding), where control is 
considered by determining 
shareholder control over an entity’s 
decision-making processes and the 
impact this has on the election of 
persons to the board.  






 Exemption: Shareholders owning 
<10% aren’t considered when 
aggregating ownership to determine 
the 50% requirement. 
Exemption: A CFC isn’t considered 
to be in a low-tax jurisdiction if the 
foreign taxes payable are at least 
75% of UK tax that would’ve been 
payable had the entity been a UK 
resident. 
Exemption: Shareholders owning 
<10% aren’t considered when 
aggregating ownership to determine 





   Exemption: An entity isn’t 
considered to be a CFC where there 
is an equal partnership between 
foreigners and US persons 
 
Building 
blocks 3, 4 & 
5: 







CFC income: Defined as “net 
income” which determines the 
entity’s taxable income as if it had 
been a resident. 
CFC income: Profits of the CFC 
(excluding capital gains) are taxable 
in the UK. 
CFC income: Undistributed passive 
income (including the CFC’s 
earnings derived from investments 
in US property) and GILTI income 






CFC income: All income of an FCC 
or FA is considered to be CFC 
income.  
 
345 Section 9D 
346 Smith, 2013:127-131 (refer Section 3.2.3) 
347 Choi & Rienstra, 2020 (refer Section 3.2.2) 
348 Bianco & Santos, 2017; Violin, 2014a; Violin, 2014b (refer Section 5.3.1) 
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South Africa United Kingdom United States of America Brazil 
 Income exemption: De minimis rule 
– income that has met the 
requirements of the CFC charge 
gateway test (see below) is exempt 
where this is less than 5% of the 
CFC’s total income. 
Income exemption: De minimis rule 
– where the total of foreign base 
company and insurance income is 
less than 5% of the CFC’s total 
income, or $1 million, this income is 
exempt. 
 
Income exemption: Net income is 
deemed to be nil if the foreign taxes 
payable are at least 75% of tax that 
would’ve been payable had the 
entity been a resident. 
Income exemption: If the foreign 
taxes payable are at least 75% of 
the corresponding UK tax, then the 
income is exempt. 
Income exemption: If the foreign 
taxes payable are at least 90% of 
the US tax rate, then the income is 
exempt. 
Income exemption: Profits 
attributable to other FCCs are 
excluded from CFC income. 
Income exemption: Income 
attributable to an FBE is deemed to 
be nil in the definition of net income. 
Income exemption: Income is 
exempt if the CFC generates bona 
fide trading income. 
Income exemption: GILTI 
exemptions – 50% deduction of 
GILTI income until 2025, 37.5% 
thereafter. 
Income exemption: Income relating 
to the pre-operational phases in the 
oil and gas industries are excluded. 
  Income exemption: Low profits – 
where a CFC’s accounting profits 
are less than £50 000, don’t exceed 
£500 000 (and non-trading income is 
less than £50 000) or are less than 
10% of operational expenditure, the 
income is exempt. 
Income exemption: If the sum of 
GILTI and FDII exceeds a US 
shareholder’s taxable income, the 
GILTI exemption may be limited. 
 
  Income exemption: Group finance 
exemption – CFCs have the option 
to elect that either 0% or 25% of 
their total financing income earned 
could be subjected to taxation. 
  
  Income exemption: Income from 
CFCs located in specified 
jurisdictions is exempt. 
  
  Income exemption: Where a CFC 
becomes UK-controlled, all income 
is exempted for the first 12 months. 
  
 Included income: FBE income 
attributable to diversionary 
transactions between related parties 
is included to determine net income. 
Included income: CFC charge 
gateway test – profits that “pass 
through the gateway” are subject to 
UK tax. 
Included income: Where insurance 
income and foreign base company 
income exceeds 70% of the CFC’s 
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 South Africa United Kingdom United States of America Brazil 
 Attribution: Income is attributed to 
shareholders in proportion to their 
shareholding, or according to the 
percentage outlined by IFRS 10 in 
the financial results. 
Attribution: Income is attributed to 
shareholders in proportion to their 
shareholding 
Attribution: Income is attributed to 
shareholders in proportion to their 
shareholding. 
Attribution: Income is attributed in 
proportion to a shareholder’s 
shareholding. This is attributed in 
December each year. In the case of 
an FA that’s not located in a low-tax 
jurisdiction, however, this income is 
attributed upon the distribution of a 
dividend.  
    Payment deferral: Taxpayers have 8 
years in which to settle their CFC 
income-tax obligations (outstanding 
tax liabilities do, however, attract 
interest at LIBOR). 
    Consolidation of CFC income: 
Shareholders have the ability to 
consolidate the profits and losses of 
their CFC income in their tax returns 







Foreign tax credits: The South 
African tax payable on net income is 
determined after deducting the 
foreign taxes paid. 
 Foreign tax credits: Foreign taxes 
are deemed to be “paid” on taxable 
distributions from CFCs – this 
reduces the US tax payable on CFC 
income. 
Foreign tax credits: The Brazilian tax 
payable is determined after 
deducting the foreign taxes paid 
(corporate tax and withholding 
taxes). FAs may only have 
withholding taxes deducted. 
Income subject to withholding tax: 
Income on which withholding taxes 
are paid (e.g., interest, dividends 
and royalties) is not considered to 
be net income 
 Foreign tax credits: Where a 
shareholder has imputed GILTI, 
80% of foreign taxes paid may be 
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APPENDIX II: CBC REPORTING TEMPLATES  
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APPENDIX III: CFC REPORTING 
 














351 SARS.gov.za, 2019c 
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